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ABSTRACT
The 2010 federal health insurance reform act includes an individual
mandate that will require Americans to carry health insurance. This article
argues that even if the mandate were to catalyze universal health insurance
coverage, it will fall short on some of the policy objectives many hope to achieve
through a mandate if implemented in a fragmented insurance market. To
uncover this problem, this article sets forth a novel framework that
disentangles three different policy objectives the individual mandate can serve.
Namely, supporters of the mandate might hope for it to: (1) facilitate greater
health and financial security for the uninsured (“paternalism”); (2) eliminate
inefficiencies in health care delivery and financing (“efficiency”); and/or (3)
require the healthy to buy insurance to help fund medical care for the sick
(“health redistribution”). Health redistribution – the primary focus of this
article – is a shifting of wealth from the healthy to the sick through the
mechanism of risk pooling. Many see health redistribution as a means to
enable all Americans to more equitably access medical care on the basis of
need, rather than on the basis of ability or willingness to pay.
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Drawing on evidence from the implementation of an individual mandate
in Massachusetts’s health reform in 2006, this article reveals that the
fragmented American health insurance market will thwart the mandate’s
ability to achieve these objectives— in particular the goal of health
redistribution. Fragmentation is an atomization of the insurance market into
numerous risk pools that has been driven by market competition and
regulation. It prevents Americans from sharing broadly in the risk of poor
health and, in doing so, entrenches a system where access to medical care
remains tied to ability to pay and individualized characteristics. The final
section of this article examines how various policies, including some in the
new law (e.g., insurance regulation and exchanges) and others not (e.g.,
expanded public insurance), can reduce fragmentation so that the mandate
can successfully serve all desired objectives and in the process gain greater
legitimacy over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Driving the 2009-2010 federal health reform debate has been a widelyshared desire to address the problem of an estimated 46 million uninsured
Americans.1 At the heart of the newly enacted federal health insurance reform
legislation (“Health Reform Law”) is an “individual mandate,” which will
attempt to address this problem by requiring Americans to carry health
insurance.2
The individual mandate has been held up as the “American” way to
achieve universal coverage, where every citizen can choose her own insurance,
and commercial insurers can compete for profit. By laying claims to coverage,
choice, and competition, the mandate has garnered a strong and diverse set of
supporters. Hillary Clinton and John Edwards championed the individual
1
US Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Income, Poverty, and Health
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007 20 (2008). Contentious efforts at health
reform seeking universal coverage have been woven throughout 20 th Century politics. Efforts
began in the Progressive Era, when the American Association for Labor Legislation introduced
legislation requiring insurance for all workers. President Franklin Roosevelt proposed
national health insurance in 1934, but dropped it in response to resistance by medical
professionals. President Truman rekindled the push for national insurance in 1945, which
resulted in Medicare and Medicaid under President Johnson in 1965. Recently, the Clinton
administration made a famous failed attempt at health reform in the 1990s. See Paul Starr,
What Happened to Health Care Reform? , 20 The American Prospect 20 (1995) (an analysis
of the Clinton administration’s health reform failure). For discussion of the history of health
reform, see Tom Daschle et al., Critical: What We Can Do About the Health Care
Crisis 49-51 (2008); Theodore R. Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, Paths to Universal Health
Insurance: Progressive Lessons from the Past for the Future, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev 205 (2004).
2
On March 23, 2010, President Barak Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and
Affordable
Care
Act,
Pub.
L.
No.
111-148
(2010),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h3590eas.txt.pdf
(last accessed Feb. 14,
2010). The final health reform act will almost certainly include a companion bill, The Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, which was passed by both the
Senate and House on March 25, 2010. At times throughout this draft, I refer to the House
Bill, the Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 501 (2009), which
the House passed on November 7, 2009 and was superseded by the Senate version of
legislation that was enacted into law, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c111:H.R.3962: (last accessed February 14, 2010).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341955

OIL AND WATER

9

mandate during the 2008 Democratic primary race. Former Governor of
Massachusetts Mitt Romney, a Republican, proposed it as a key element of
the Commonwealth’s health reform, which was enacted into law by an
overwhelmingly Democratic legislature in 2006.3 The health insurance
industry, historically resistant to national reform, has supported an individual
mandate and has even offered concessions in return for inclusion of the
mandate in legislation.
Much attention by scholars, think tanks, and the media on the individual
mandate has focused on whether the mandate can achieve the goal of insuring
all Americans and at what cost.4 Proponents of the mandate argue a mandate
is necessary to achieve universal coverage.5 Opponents say it is a very
expensive way to pursue only modest gains in coverage at an unacceptable
insult to individual autonomy.6
Yet, there is no clear expression of, or consensus as to, why we would want
to increase coverage through an individual mandate. What would we hope to
accomplish by requiring every American carry health insurance?
I suggest in this article that there are three primary reasons that drive
support for the individual mandate. First, some people are worried about the
3
2006 Mass. Acts Chapter 58, An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality,
Accountable Health Care, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111M, § 2 (2008) [hereinafter Chapter 58].
4
See, e.g., Republican Study Comm., RSC Policy Brief: An Individual Mandate to
Purchase Health Insurance 2-4 (2008); Linda Blumberg & John Holohan, Urban
Inst., Do Individual Mandates Matter? 1-3 (2008); Sherry A. Glied et al., Consider It
Done? The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26 Health Aff. 1612, 1615
(2007); Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the U.S., 46 J. Econ. Lit. 571, 601
(2008) (analyzing approaches to health reform and making budgetary efficiency targeting
argument for mandates); David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan; The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1103, 1111 (2006); Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. Braun,
Let 1000 Flowers Wilt: The Futility of State-Level Health Care Reform, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1173
(2007) (summarizing past state efforts at reform with an emphasis on discussion of individual
and employer mandates); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Public
Insurance for the Poor, Private Insurance for the Wealthy, Self-Insurance for the Rest, 55 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 1091 (2007) (arguing that the MA plan results in three tiers of health insurance);
Alan B. Krueger & Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Economics of Employer Versus Individual
Mandates, 13(2) Health Aff. 34, 40 (1994); C. Eugene Steuerle, Implementing Employer and
Individual Mandates, 13(2) Health Aff. 54 (1994) (discussing administrative challenges in
terms of collection and enforcement); Michael Tanner, Cato Inst., Individual Mandates
for Health Insurance: Slippery Slope to National Health Care (2006); Glen
Whitman, Hazards of the Individual Health Care Mandate, Cato Policy Report, Sept./Oct.
2007, at 1 (outlining potential adverse effects on policy and benefit design and on free riding);
Sherry Glied, Mandates and the Affordability of Health Care (Economic Research Initiative on
the Uninsured Working Paper Series, Paper No. 59, 2008) (describing the economics of the
affordability exemption); Jonathan Cohn, Mandate Overboard, The New Republic (Dec. 7,
2007), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/mandate-overboard; Einer Elhauge, Coverage v.
Coercion, Huffington Post (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/einerelhauge/coverage-v-coercion_b_89686.html (questioning whether coercion of mandates is
validated by effect on free rider problem); Jonathan Gruber et al., New America
Foundation, Health Debate Reality Check: The Role of Individual Requirements
(2007),
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/8824/Health%20Debate%20Reality
%20Check.pdf.
5
See, e.g., Blumberg & Holohan, supra note 4; Gruber, supra note 4; Gruber et al.,
supra note 4.
6
See, e.g., Republican Study Comm., supra note 4; Tanner, supra note 4; Whitman,
supra note 4.
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wellbeing of the uninsured themselves, motivated by the uninsured individual
whose cancer or heart disease will go undiagnosed and lead to premature
death or, if diagnosed, will cause him to choose between his financial and
physical wellbeing because of the high costs of his medical care. Validating
such concerns, a recent report by Harvard researchers reports lack of health
insurance is associated with 45,000 deaths a year in the United States.7
Alternatively, some are interested in their own bottom line, angry that the
uninsured don’t “pay their share,” making insurance more expensive for
everyone else. Their support for the mandate is animated by the stories of the
28 year-old who decided he was healthy enough to “go bare” without
insurance coverage and then has a mountain biking accident that results in
tens of thousands of dollars of emergency room care he can’t afford.
Others struggle morally with the fact that nearly 1/5 of all Americans lack
insurance, particularly if they are poor or sick, and what such a reality says
about us as a nation of people.8 They want to ensure that we create a system
that enables all members of their community – locally and nationally – to have
equitable access to good medical care when in need.
In this article, I contend that by failing to look closely at these different
objectives and what it would take to achieve them, policy debates about the
individual mandate have obscured the fact that even if the mandate were to
lead to 100 percent coverage, it could fail to achieve what many people
envision and hope it to do. By untangling the different policy objectives
supporters intend an individual mandate to serve, it becomes clear that the
mandate will face serious barriers to success in our current “fragmented”
health insurance markets, by which I mean insurance markets that divide
people and groups up on the basis of risk.
This article tells the story of the individual mandate and fragmentation in
three parts. First, it sets forth a novel framework to examine the three
objectives an individual mandate can serve – which I characterize as
paternalism, efficiency, and health redistribution – that each justify use of a
mandate for some of its supporters. Second, it brings past research on
fragmentation of health insurance markets, often discussed within the realm
of economics, into the legal and policy debate to define and shine a light on
the critical problems fragmentation will cause for implementation of a
mandate, particularly with respect to the goal of health redistribution.9
Finally, it considers how policy solutions, including prohibition of risk
selection in the private market or creation of public insurance alternatives,
could ameliorate fragmentation and perhaps in doing so also enhance the
long-term political legitimacy of an individual mandate.
As context for this story of the challenges the individual mandate will face
in a fragmented market, Part II describes how the individual mandate differs
7
Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in U.S. Adults, 99 Am. J. Pub.
Health 2289, 2292 (2009).
8
U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 1, at 23.
9
Fragmentation is present in different forms throughout the system of health care
delivery and financing and thus has received, in one form or another, considerable attention
from scholars. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care:
Causes and Solutions (forthcoming 2010); Nan Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative
Democracy in Health Care, 97 Geo. L.J. 1, 17-27 (2008) (discussion of health law as a field of
risk-centered governance).
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from the policy approaches other industrialized countries have taken toward
the goal of universal coverage. It also explores the mechanism by which the
individual mandate works and how it can affect the uninsured as both
consumers of insurance and (for some) as “financiers,” who will pay more for
premiums than they consume in care and thus help finance medical care for
others. This second influence supports the mandate’s ability to affect
distributive goals.
Part III detangles how an individual mandate can serve three different
policy objectives. It describes how some support the mandate for paternalistic
reasons; their objective is that all Americans have insurance that protects
them from poor health and financial insecurity. Others, including many of
the health economists defining the health reform policy elements, see the
mandate as a tool to reduce inefficient use of care by the uninsured or to
promote more efficient health insurance markets by addressing the problem
of adverse selection. Finally – and the primary focus of this paper – some
support the mandate for redistributive reasons so that the risk of poor health
is shouldered more equally by all Americans.
The mandate promotes such redistribution by requiring the uninsured
who have arguably rationally opted out of the insurance market (because they
are healthy and unlikely to need medical care) to buy health insurance
nonetheless to finance care for those sicker or less lucky than themselves.
When the healthy and the sick pool risk, it creates a redistribution of wealth
from the healthy to the sick, which I call “health redistribution" in contrast to
“income redistribution,” whereby wealthy are taxed to provide health care for
the poor (e.g., in Medicaid).
Advocates of expanding health insurance coverage, in general, and of the
individual mandate, in particular, have explored political, pragmatic, and
moral benefits of health redistribution that I discuss in Part III.C below. They
argue, for example, that health redistribution enhances the political feasibility
of funding subsidies for insurance coverage for the poor and sick, by
facilitating subsidies within the bounds of a defined program and among a
broader base, thus avoiding the sharp division between haves and have-nots
created by income tax-based subsidies.10 Scholars also have argued health
redistribution might address distributive justice concerns with less labor
distortion than an income tax might.11 Effective health redistribution might
also unlock greater insurance market efficiency by reducing practices of
medical underwriting and risk selection.
Finally, I show that some scholars see health redistribution as a means to
institutionalize a more solidaristic regime of health insurance in the U.S.,
where access to health care can be divorced from market forces or individual
wealth.12 In other words, for some, implementing an individual mandate
10

See infra Part III.C.
Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1449, 1455 (1994).
12
For examinations of health and solidarity, see Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon,
Embracing Risk, in Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and
Responsibility 1, 6 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance,
and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture
of Insurance and Responsibility 33, 47 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Mary
Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev 73,
73 (2005); Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the Health
11
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would be tantamount to asking Americans to act collectively so that everyone
– rich, poor, sick, or healthy – can access medical care when in need,
regardless of income or health status. This notion of health solidarity has
deep roots in health care provision historically in the U.S., through mutual aid
societies and religious organizations, and is a central attribute of health care
in all other advanced nations.13 I explore whether a mandate that affects
health redistribution might indeed not only institutionalize a more solidaristic
form of insurance but, perhaps in the long term, help to generate popular and
political support for a more solidaristic system of insurance.14
Yet, in Part IV, I contend that the individual mandate will not be able to
realize such benefits that rely upon its ability to promote health redistribution
if it is implemented in a fragmented health insurance market. Fragmentation
is an atomization of the health insurance market into numerous risk pools – a
complex process that has been fueled by private market competition and
exacerbated by regulation in both intentional and unintentional ways.
Commercial insurers’ profit relies upon their ability to segment people into
groups of predictable or similar risk and price according to risk or to select out
good risks (i.e., cherry picking). To better manage risk and profit, insurers
have carved up the insurance market into submarkets – large group, small
group, and individual. Risk is not pooled among these three markets. This
means that if healthy individuals are disproportionately insured in one market
and sick in another, they don’t share in risk and medical costs. Furthermore,
in the individual market (and somewhat the small group market), risk pooling
may be limited among individual insureds to the extent insurers are permitted
under state law to design premiums and coverage based on projections of
individual risk.15 One often examined driver of fragmentation, for example, is
Care System on the Health of America, 39 St. Louis U. L. J. 7, 9 (1994); Sharona Hoffman,
Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Coverage, 78 Ind. L. J. 659, 668 (2003);
Hunter, supra note 9, at 48-50 (promoting health solidarity within the workplace by creating
a system of deliberative democracy to manage employer sponsored plans and increase citizens’
ability to “infuse risk allocation discourse with moral values”); John V. Jacobi, The Ends of
Health Insurance, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 311, 363-66 (1997); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health
Care Access in the United States: Conflicting Concepts of Justice and Little Solidarity, 27 Med.
& L. 605, 605-07 (2008); Wendy Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in
Health Reform, 14 Conn. Ins. L. J. 199, 201-03 (2008); Amy Monahan, Health Insurance Risk
Pool and Social Solidarity: A Response to Professor David Hyman, 14 Conn. Ins. L. J. 325,
325-26 (2008); Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 Health Matrix 155,
155 (2004); Anja Rudiger, From Market Competition to Solidarity? Assessing the Prospects of
U.S. Health Care Reform Plans from a Human Rights Perspective, 10 Health and Hum. Rts.
123, 125-27 (2008); Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J.
Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 287, 290-92 (1993) (describing the history of solidarity and health).
13
See Kieke Okma, Nat’l Acad. of Soc. Insur., Recent Changes in Dutch Health
Insurance:
Individual Mandate or Social Insurance? 6-7 (2009), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/okma.pdf; Richard B. Saltman & Hans. F.W. Dubois, The
Historical and Social Base of Social Health Insurance Systems, in Social Health Insurance
Systems in Western Europe 21, 29, (Richard B. Saltman et al. eds., 2004); Stone, supra
note 12, at 291.
14
See infra note 196 for studies and articles that explore conditions that generate mutual
aid.
15
Some states have enacted laws that in essence require risk pooling through community
rating, rate bands, mandated benefits or guaranteed issue of insurance. See discussion infra
note 228. Cf. Economists Mark Pauly and Bradley Herring have shown evidence that there
may be some risk pooling in the individual market even in unregulated states. See discussion
infra note 231.
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risk classification and selection practices used by private insurers.16 By
creating such crevasses that limit the scope of risk pooling, fragmentation
makes it impossible to distribute costs of poor health broadly among both
healthy and sick, even as the mandate compels more healthy people join risk
pools.
Channeling an individual mandate through this fragmented insurance
infrastructure may prove counterproductive. First, for some, the purpose of
compelling the healthy to buy insurance is in part so they help fund care for
the sick. Participation by healthy Americans is futile when the healthy and
sick don’t pool risk with each other. Further, if poorer and sicker Americans
must bear more of the cost of their own risk, they may have a harder time
affording necessary medical care – a result antithetical to what many hope to
achieve with an individual mandate.
To illustrate this story of the thorny interplay between the individual
mandate and fragmented markets, this article draws from evidence from the
2006 health reform in Massachusetts that requires most Massachusetts
residents over 18 to carry health insurance.17 The Massachusetts individual
mandate significantly increased insurance coverage levels in the state18 and
has been increasingly popular,19 yet simultaneously exhibits the challenges an
individual mandate will face if implemented in a fragmented insurance
market.
Although Massachusetts has made some strides to address
fragmentation, implementing many of the same policies that are included in
the federal Health Reform Law, remaining fragmentation contributes to
problems such as exemption of some residents from the mandate on
“affordability” grounds and variable quality of coverage among the insured.20
Fragmentation is not an easy problem to fix. The most elegant solution
may be a single payer system designed to completely eliminate fragmentation.
However, a single payer model has not been contemplated as part of current
federal reform efforts, and most would say is politically unlikely in the near
term. Thus, while recognizing its benefits, I focus in Part V on evaluating
solutions that may prove more politically feasible in the near term because of
compatibility with preservation of private insurance markets. I consider both
elements that have been enacted as part of the Health Reform Law (e.g.,
regulation of private insurers and creation of exchanges for the sale of

16
E.g., Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517,
517 (1983); Baker, supra note 12, at 33-35; Donald Light, The Practice and Ethics of RiskRated Health Insurance, 267 JAMA 2503, 2503-05 (1992). See Jonathan Simon, The
Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 L. & Soc. Rev. 771, 772-73 (1988); Stone, supra
note 12, at 292-95.
17
Chapter 58, supra note 3.
18
Prior to reform, ~10% of the Massachusetts population was uninsured (650,000).
Recent estimates are that 2.6% remain uninsured. Sharon K. Long & Mindy Cohen, The
Urban Inst., Getting Ready for Reform: Insurance Coverage and Access to Use of
Care in Massachusetts in Fall 2006 2-3 (2006); Sharon K. Long et al., The Urban
Inst. & The Mass. Div. of Health Care Finance and Pol’y, Estimates of the
Uninsurance Rate in Massachusetts from Survey Data: Why Are They So Different?
9 (2008).
19
Robert J. Blendon et al., Massachusetts Health Reform: A Public Perspective from
Debate Through Implementation, 27 Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) w556, w558 (2008),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/27/6/w556.
20
See, e.g., Jost, supra note 4.
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insurance) and also elements that are not part of this initial reform but could
be pursued, consistent with the shape of the new Law, over the coming years
to further address fragmentation as the law is implemented. Finally, I posit
whether softening the current, finely-drawn boundaries of insurance markets
and programs might not only reduce fragmentation but begin to shape a
broader public and political interest in programs that rely upon health
redistribution to increase equitable access to medical care.
II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE, THE UNINSURED, AND INSURANCE
A. Models of Universal Coverage and the Individual Mandate
Most industrialized countries treat health insurance as social insurance,
where people contribute toward financing based on ability to pay, where risk
of poor health is pooled broadly, and where access to care is provided on the
basis of need.21 It is often remarked that many of these countries achieve
health outcomes equal to or better than the United States at lower costs per
person.22
These countries have relied upon several different models to achieve
universal coverage, which differ based upon the role of public and private
entities in the financing, purchasing, and delivery of care. For example, in
some countries, the government finances health care through tax revenue.
Such a model might leave the production of the medical care primarily to a
mix of public and private entities (e.g., Canada, United States Medicare). Or
in system of socialized medicine, such as in the British National Health
Service or the Veterans Administration in the United States, the government
both finances care and also controls the delivery of care (i.e., owns hospitals
and pays physician salaries).23 Government-financed and owned medical care
is often called a Beveridge system, after Lord Beveridge, who designed the
British health system after World War II.24
A competing model of social insurance system relies not on the state but
rather upon highly-regulated private entities (for-profit and non-profit) to
administer compulsory health insurance; these entities are sometimes called
sickness funds and are often organized by profession, region, or religion and
funded through targeted funding, often separate from general tax revenue.25
21

Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Disentitlement? 14-15 (2003). See Posting of Uwe. E.
Reinhardt to N.Y. Times Economix Blog, Health Reform Without a Public Plan: The German
Model,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/health-reform-without-a-publicplan-the-german-model (April 17, 2009, 07:02 EST).
22
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Health Care Spending: Comparison with
other
OECD
Countries
50-51
(2007),
available
at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34175_20070917.pdf; Jost, supra note 21, at 3.
23
See Jost, supra note 21, at 204-34; Posting of Uwe E. Reinhardt to N.Y. Times
Economix Blog, What is ‘Socialized Medicine’? A Taxonomy of Health Care Systems,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/what-is-socialized-medicine-a-taxonomy-ofhealth-care-systems/ (May 8, 2009, 06:48 EST).
24
Jost, supra note 21, at 235; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do?
National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 443, 443 (2004).
25
Richard B. Saltman, Social Health Insurance in Perspective: The Challenge of
Sustaining Stability, in Social Health Insurance Systems in Western Europe 3 (Richard
B. Saltman et al. eds., 2004); JOST, supra note 21, at 235-264.
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Origins of this model of health insurance are often attributed to Germany,
which legislated mandatory (for some), state-supervised sickness funds in
1883, under Chancellor Otto von Bismark, to seize power from Marxistinfluenced labor unions.26 But its roots reach back further to medieval guilds,
churches, and, later, unions that collectivized financing of medical care for
members.27 Although this model of social insurance often incorporates
individual choice of provider and sickness funds, it differs from commercial
insurance in that it is designed to achieve social ends and, in particular, to be
redistributive in nature (across ages, health status, income, and individuals
and families).28 Richard Saltman describes this model as “the administrative
embodiment of a set of values deeply rooted in the society as a whole … and
grounded in the historically generated principles of collective responsibility
and social solidarity.”29 In many systems that follow this model, the
government still plays an active role in financing, by determining premium
costs and providing subsidies for the poor, even if purchasing is delegated to
insurers or sickness funds. More recently, some countries – including
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland – have introduced some level of
competition between funds or insurers for enrollees.30 Even though the
competition occurs within a highly regulated environment to preserve the
goals of social insurance,31 some are concerned that competition has led to
rising costs and increased risk selection and might undermine the foundation
of social insurance within these countries’ systems.32
Current discussions of reform in the United States have not seriously
considered a centrally-financed insurance model (often referred to as “single
payer”). In fact, even mention of such an approach has historically proven to
be a political lightning rod in the United States, provoking claims of
“socialized medicine” (often inaccurate since centralized financing can exist
with private delivery of medical care) and anti-reform media that quickly
quashes reform efforts.33
Instead, 2009 reform efforts and the resultant Health Reform Law
envision using government mandates to achieve universal coverage without
fundamentally restructuring the existing payment and delivery systems. The
proposed reform does not fundamentally change the primarily private delivery

26

Saltman, supra note 25 at 21-23.
Id. at 27.
28
Id. at 5.
29
Saltman, supra note 25, at 6.
30
E.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Experience of Switzerland and the Netherlands with
Individual Health
Insurance
Mandates:
A
Model
for
the
United
States?
1,
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Faculty/Jost%20The%20Experience%20of%20Switzerland%
20and%20the%20Netherlands.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2010); Robert E. Leu et al., The
Commonwealth Fund, The Swiss and Dutch Health Insurance Systems: Universal
Coverage and Regulated Competitive Insurance Markets 8-11 (2009); Okma, supra
note 13, at 4-7.
31
Anna Dixon et al., Solidarity and Comptetition in Social Health Insurance Countries, in
Social Health Insurance Systems in Western Europe 170, 170-71, 174-76 (Richard B.
Saltman et al. eds., 2004).
32
Id. at 176-77; see also Jost, supra note 30.
33
See, e.g., Daschle et al., supra note 1, at 49, 53, 78; Reinhardt, supra note 23.
27
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of health care and mix of public and private financing.34 The government’s
overarching role in reform is simply as a catalyst. The contemplated approach
would create a system that looks more like that in Germany, Switzerland, or
the Netherlands, where participation is compulsory, and insurance is
administered by private entities and funded through a mix of public and
private sources. Yet the United States is building on a framework of
actuarially-rated commercial insurance, whose end goal is profit, rather than
on a system of social insurance directed toward the goals of collective benefit
and universal access to care. This contradiction complicates the use of the
mandate in the U.S., as explored below.
There are several different types of mandates that the government could
rely on to expand coverage. One such mandate could require all employers
provide or subsidize insurance coverage for employees; currently, U.S.
employers have no such obligation.35 This type of “employer mandate” was
included in the Clinton reform proposals, is part of the Massachusetts health
reform of 2006, and is included in a light version in the Health Reform Law.
Alternately, the government might mandate that insurers include certain
people or conditions within their health plans (a “mandated benefit”). While I
will discuss the impact of both of these types of mandates in Part IV below,
neither of these is the primary subject of this article.
The focus of this article is the “individual mandate” that requires
Americans to carry health insurance and is a cornerstone of the Health
Reform Law.36 Individual mandates can be distinguished from other
mandates such as employer mandates or insurer mandates based upon their
mechanism for compliance – individual action. We have seen individual
mandates that require drivers hold motor vehicle insurance, parents vaccinate
children against contagious diseases, motorists wear seatbelts, and 18-yearold men register for the draft. A legal mandate compels each individual to use
his or her own resources (money and/or time) in a way he or she might not
without government intervention. In the case of health insurance, the
individual mandate will require Americans to navigate the current patchwork
of public and private coverage options to obtain coverage.
The individual mandate is intriguing in part because it blurs distinctions
between social and commercial insurance. The defining characteristic of this
34
Professor Ted Marmor describes how Americans’ schizophrenia toward health care
entitlement has resulted in five “Americas.” First, the VA is socialized medicine, where
because of veterans’ sacrifice, we provide comprehensive, specialized benefits. Second, in
Medicare Part A or disability coverage, contributory financing during the working life offers
later protection against financial threats to well-being resulting from poor health; there is no
connection between proportional/progressive financing and later distribution of benefits.
Third, Medicaid is a means-tested program akin to European poor law. Fourth, in
employment-related private insurance, the insured pay directly for the benefits you receive.
Fifth, we provide some charity care at the individual level, which we have required with
respect to emergency care under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA). Cf. Theodore R. Marmor et al., America’s Misunderstood Welfare State
22-31 (BasicBooks 1990).
35
Some states have tried to impose a participation requirement on employers through
“pay or play,” requiring employer contribution to its employees’ coverage or payment of a
penalty to the state. The legality of such laws, which face risk of preemption under the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), will possibly be determined by the
Supreme Court this session. I discuss employer mandates further in Part IV below.
36
H.R. 3590, supra note 2.
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approach to expanding coverage by individual mandate is that it largely leaves
the current structures of the commercial insurance market intact, while
requiring more people to participate in it.37 Yet, the mandate is intended to
achieve policy goals typically pursued through social insurance. Ensuing
conflict between the policy goals of the mandate and commercial health
insurance forms much of the basis of discussion in Part III below about
impediments fragmentation pose for the individual mandate.
B. The Fragmented American Health Insurance Market
The individual mandate will channel the uninsured into what has become
a fragmented American health insurance market. Fragmentation is a word
often used to characterize American health care, describing the
decentralization of decision makers, payers, providers, or regulation.38 In this
article, I use the term fragmented to describe the splintering of insurance
markets into smaller parts to divide people and groups up on the basis of risk.
Insurance markets have become atomized into smaller sub-markets in the
name of managing and avoiding risk. This process of insurance market
fragmentation has reduced the breadth of risk pooling and lays the
groundwork for inequities among markets and insureds. I provide a brief
overview of the end result here. In Part IV, I examine in greater depth how
fragmentation has occurred, through both competition and regulation, and
why it creates critical problems for the individual mandate.
The primary divide in American health insurance is between public and
private insurance with public insurance often covering more high-risk
enrollees.39 Roughly 100 million Americans have publically-subsidized
insurance, including the elderly, poor, disabled, and veterans, each group in a
discrete public program.40 Public health insurance mimics some goals of
social insurance and accounts for nearly 50 percent of all health spending in
the country but is by no measure a cohesive system.41
Medicaid, which is the largest program, currently insures about 61 million
low-income or disabled beneficiaries through both state and federal funds.42
Medicare covers 45 million elderly or disabled.43 Other public programs
provide benefits for children whose families’ incomes are too high for
Medicaid (State Children’s Health Insurance Program, “SCHIP”), American

37
It is likely, of course, that any policy built upon an individual mandate will impose a
number of additional regulations on commercial insurers. Such regulations are discussed in
Part V below.
38
See Elhauge, supra note 9.
39
Cf. Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health Insurance Reform in One Easy Lesson, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 652, 652-53 (2008).
40
For a description of this patchwork, see Daschle et al., supra note 1, at 29-38.
41
Susan Jaffe, Health Policy Brief: A Public Health Insurance Plan 2 (2009),
available
at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_4.pdf.
42
Id.
43
Medicare covered thirty-eight million people aged sixty-five and older and seven
million people under sixty-five with disabilities in 2008. The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Found., Medicare: A Primer 1 (2009), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-02.pdf
[hereinafter KFF Medicare: A Primer].
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Indians and Alaskan Natives (Indian Health Services, “”is") and the military
and veterans (“CHAMPUS” and “TRICARE”).
The rest of the insured (~150 million) are covered by private insurance,
which is divided loosely into three markets – large group (which is itself
divided into fully and self-funded insurance, as described below), small group,
and individual. Health insurance is sold differently in each of these three
markets, and, for the most part, carriers who sell insurance operate in only
one of these three markets.44 Furthermore, as discussed below, the health
insurance market is regulated at the state level, and the number and type of
carriers differ state-by-state.
The majority of privately insured Americans still obtain their health
insurance coverage through an employer, even as the prominence of
employer-sponsored insurance (“ESI”) declines.45 ESI is carved up into large
group and small group insurance (2-50 employees). Large group plans can
be “fully insured,” where an insurer bears risk under the plan. This means
that an employer pays the insurer premiums, and if medical costs for the year
exceed premiums, the insurer is at risk for such losses.46 In contrast, some
large employers have “self-funded” plans, where they bear the risk
themselves.47 They create a reserve for medical claims, design and administer
a coverage plan, with the help, usually, of an insurer as a third-party
administrator (“TPA”), and then pay for medical losses under the plan out of
the reserve.
The frequency of self-funded health plans has increased dramatically over
the past two decades, so that now 55 percent of covered workers (over 30
percent of the total non-elderly population) are members of self-funded plans,
for reasons discussed in Part IV below.48 Each self-funded plan acts as an
isolated risk pool, extracting its members from larger insurance risk pools.
A small, but not insignificant, number of people (6-7 percent of the nonelderly) obtain insurance directly through the individual market, which is
typically considered more unstable and more expensive dollar-per-dollar, as
discussed further in Part IV.49
The remaining 16-17 percent of the total non-elderly population is
uninsured.50 Under an individual mandate, the uninsured could seek

44
Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance Markets,
2 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 89, 95-96 (2001).
45
Id. at 94. Sixty percent of all firms offer health benefits, down from a recent high of
69% in 2000. Kaiser Family Found. et al., Employer Health Benefits: 2007 Annual
Survey 36 (2007), http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf [hereinafter KFF
Employer Health Benefits: 2007].
46
In reality, most insurers buy reinsurance policies that limit their exposure.
47
If at the end of the year, employee health costs are higher than the reserve, the company
must cover these costs. If employee health costs are lower than projected, the company retains
the surplus in the plan. See infra Part B (explaining how ERISA preemption rules have
created incentives for employers to self insure).
48
KFF Employer Health Benefits: 2007, supra note 45, at 147.
49
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Health Insurance Coverage in America:
2007
1
(2007),
http://facts.kff.org/chartbooks/Health%20Insurance%20Coverage%20in%20America,%2020
07.pdf [hereinafter KFF Health Insurance Coverage in America].
50
Id.
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coverage through any of these sub-markets, as they have done in
Massachusetts following the 2006 reform.51
C. The Uninsured as Consumers and Financiers
The individual mandate could inject into this fragmented market some 46
million uninsured, and in doing so it will influence these uninsured in two
ways.52 The first influence, which has been well-explored, is that the mandate
converts all uninsured to policyholders (or consumers) of insurance. The
second, less-examined influence is that the mandate causes some uninsured to
pay more for insurance than they spend in care. By so doing, it converts them
into “financiers” of others’ care, which is critical to the mandate’s ability to
achieve redistributive objectives and to promote solidarity.
An understanding of why people are uninsured helps bring these two
distinct influences to light.53 Many of the uninsured are lower-income
workers for whom insurance is arguably “unaffordable” or unattainable.54
Over 60 percent of the uninsured earn less than 200 percent of the Federal
Poverty Level (FPL).55 An estimated 25 percent of the uninsured qualify for
Medicaid or SCHIP but have not enrolled.56 Some, eligible for insurance
through the individual market, may have previously been rejected for
coverage.57 For this part of the population, the concern is making insurance
policies accessible and almost certainly subsidizing the purchase of such
policies.
Yet as many as a third of the uninsured could in theory afford to buy
insurance but are nonetheless uninsured. Studies estimate as many as 17
million uninsured Americans are such “voluntary opt-outs.” 58 This segment of
the uninsured is growing faster than the low-income uninsured.59
51

See infra Part V.B.
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The Uninsured, A Primer: Key Facts About
Americans Without Insurance 1 (2009), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/745105.pdf [hereinafter KFF The Uninsured].
53
For an overview of problems of uninsurance and underinsurance, see Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, Health Care at Risk 1-16 (Duke Univ. Press 2007). For a study on the
duration of being uninsured for different populations, see Pamela Farley Short & Deborah R.
Graefe, Battery-Powered Health Insurance? Stability in Coverage of the Uninsured, 22
Health Aff. 244, 250-51 (2003) (finding that the wealthy tend to be uninsured for shorter
period of time and less frequently).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 250.
56
The reasons for not having enrolled are varied, including lack of awareness of the
programs and their eligibility criteria and cumbersome enrollment procedures. John
Holahan et al., Kaiser Comm. on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Characteristics of
the Uninsured: Who is Eligible for Public Coverage and Who Needs Help
Affording Coverage? 1, 6 (2007), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7613.pdf.
57
Sara R. Collins et al., The Commonwealth Fund, Squeezed: Why Rising
Exposure to Health Care Costs Threatens the Health and Financial Well-Being of
American
Families
4
(2006),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2006/Sep/
Squeezed%20%20Why%20Rising%20Exposure%20to%20Health%20Care%20Costs%20Thr
eatens%20the%20Health%20and%20Financial%20Well%20Being%20of/Collins_squeezedri
singhltcarecosts_953%20pdf.pdf.
58
The Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Understanding the
Uninsured
And
what
to
Do
About
Them
5
(2007),
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/UnderstandingTheUninsured0307.pdf
52
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These voluntary opt-outs have made a decision not to purchase insurance,
presumably because they perceive the cost to be higher than the benefits.60
Their choice may reflect a legitimate trade-off between health insurance and
other needs they deem more important (relatively high costs). For others, it
may be rooted in a perception that they don’t need insurance (relatively low
benefits). For the young uninsured, this way of thinking prompted the
nickname “invincibles.” If invincibles are seen as making an irrational
decision not to purchase insurance, paternalism may be a particularly
important reason for a mandate, as discussed below. But many voluntary optouts could rationally decline insurance because premiums exceed the value of
insurance to them individually, in which case paternalism cannot argue for
compelling them to buy insurance.
Considering this dichotomy of uninsured (involuntary vs. voluntary), we
can see how the mandate influences the uninsured in two distinct ways – first
as potential consumers and second as potential financiers of health care.
First, the mandate, by definition, attempts to convert each of the 46
million uninsured from a non-consumer into a consumer of health insurance;
this fact underlies strong insurance industry support of both the mandate and
also of high penalties for noncompliance.61 This goal is simply that everyone
carries health insurance, regardless of the form of insurance or who pays for
it. A non-consumer might become a consumer by enrolling in coverage
available through a public source (e.g., Medicare or Medicaid), if eligible,
through an employer’s health plan, or on their own in the individual market.
Further, they might pay for all, part, or none of the cost of their plan,
depending on what level of public or employer subsidies is available.
Second, and importantly, for a subset of the uninsured population, the
government also compels them to be financiers of health care. While this
aspect of the mandate has gone largely unexamined, it is critically important
to redistributive objectives for the mandate as discussed in Part II.
When the mandate compels the 17 million voluntary opt-outs to buy
insurance, they not only become consumers of health insurance, many will
also become financiers of health care for others. Many voluntary opt-outs
currently make decision not to buy health insurance based on low expected
medical costs, at least in the short-term. To the extent their expectations are
correct, when the mandate requires them to buy insurance, many are likely to
[hereinafter CAHI Understanding the Uninsured]. Recent estimates suggest that “young
invincibles,” who comprise a large part of the voluntary opt-outs, were 13.2 million in 2007.
Cara Buckley, For Uninsured Young Adults, Do-It-Yourself Medical Care, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18,
2009, at A1 (citing the Commonwealth Fund study).
59
CAHI Understanding the Uninsured, supra note 58, at 5.
60
These opt outs might either have decided not to purchase insurance on their own or
may have declined an offer of employer-sponsored insurance. Take up rates on employersponsored insurance are 82%. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. et al., Employer
Health Benefits: 2008 Annual Survey 47, available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf
[hereinafter KFF Employer Health Benefits: 2008].
61
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), the insurance lobby, and the Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Association have advocated for an individual mandate. See Press Release,
America’s Health Insurance Plans, America’s Health Ins. Plans, Health Plans Propose
Guaranteed Coverage for Pre-Existing Conditions and Individual Coverage Mandate (Nov. 19,
2008), available at http://www.ahip.org/content/pressrelease.aspx?docid=25068; Robert
Pear, Insurers Offer to Soften a Key Rate-Setting Policy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2009 at B1.
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pay premiums in an amount greater than what they consume in care (plus
administrative expenses and profit). 62 When this occurs, some part of their
premium payment will pay for someone else’s medical expenses. Mandating
these uninsured, the “financiers,” to purchase insurance cannot be for
paternalist reasons because such purchase is in fact not in their own
individual best interest. Rather, as explained in Part III, the mandate’s
influence over the financiers is central to redistributive objectives and can, by
promoting redistribution, also unlock greater insurance market efficiency.
Any surplus that the voluntary opt-outs pay in premiums over expenses is
the contribution they make as financiers of health care. Because they are
healthy (rich in terms of the resource of health), they are compelled to
bankroll care for people sicker than themselves. This investment may pay
back in a year when they are sick and consume more care than what they pay
in premiums, or it may not.
While I use the term “financier” to describe these net contributors, I do so
with a sense of irony and caution. Economist Jon Gruber notes that we
understand very little about this population.63 Yet, it is clear that we would
not consider many “financiers” rich. They are often young and just beginning
their careers or at an income level where the cost of insurance deters
purchase, raising questions about the fairness of compelling them to finance
others’ care, as addressed in Part III.
In addition, while it is easiest to conceptualize the financiers as a static
population, they are ever-changing and difficult to identify. The population of
financiers will shift over time; someone may be a financier in one year and a
beneficiary of other financiers in another as he ages or if he experiences, for
any number of reasons, an increased risk of poor health. The point of using
the term financier is to recognize explicitly that in health financing, every year
some people can reasonably anticipate being net contributors, subsidizing
other peoples’ premiums and medical care.
The mandate does not
differentiate financiers from non-financiers. It simply requires that someone
participate both in the years that he expects to be a net contributor as well as
when he is likely to be a net beneficiary.
There are no good estimates on the dollar amount that financiers’
premiums might provide to subsidize others’ care. And in fact, it is quite
difficult to measure this moving target, which depends on the design and
range of plans available for purchase and how much premiums are allowed to
vary based upon individual characteristics. The more financiers have access to
plans that are priced based upon their expected low risk (i.e., low cost, high
deductible health plans), the less surplus they will pay in premiums above
expenditures. This calculus also depends on whether opt-outs use more care
once insured because they are able to access necessary care or because they
become cost-insensitive once insurance pays for care – a phenomenon
referred to as moral hazard.64
Nonetheless, I offer a conservative ballpark estimate, based upon the
world of insurance pre-reform and intended for illustrative purposes only, to
62
If reform lowers the price of insurance or if once insured, they consume more care (i.e.,
moral hazard), the gap between consumption and premiums paid will narrow.
63
Gruber, supra note 4, at 581.
64
See e.g., Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. Econ. 541 (1979).
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suggest that their contribution is significant. Let us assume that under an
individual mandate the voluntary opt-outs will buy insurance and pay
premiums on average of $4000 per person, per year.65 This means 17 million
people newly insured would pay on average $4000 per person, or nearly $70
billion in premium revenue. They will of course incur some expenses to pay
for medical care, overhead, and insurer profit. Yet virtually half of the
population experiences essentially no medical care costs in any one year.66
Presumably, many voluntary opt-outs fall into this category for the reasons
discussed above. Even if we assume conservatively that half of the newly
insured population’s premiums go toward expenses, there would still be an
over $35 billion infusion of financing into risk pools. While this estimate is
extremely rough, it illustrates the potential of voluntary opt-outs as financiers.
While insufficient to fund the entire cost of covering the uninsured (estimates
are about $100-150 billion per year67), this surplus could nevertheless be quite
significant.
Thus, in summary, the individual mandate is a tool to compel the
heterogeneous population of uninsured into existing insurance markets and,
in the process, will compel all to be consumers of insurance and a subset also
to be financiers of others’ medical care.
III. PATERNALISM, EFFICIENCY, AND HEALTH REDISTRIBUTION
By compelling the 46 million uninsured to carry insurance, the individual
mandate can serve three primary types of policy objectives that I will
characterize as paternalism, efficiency, and health redistribution. 68 Failure to
clearly identify and consider each of these three types of objectives
independently in policy discussions has obscured the fact that the individual
mandate will face critical problems in achieving certain objectives,
particularly health redistribution. Support for the mandate is rooted in all
three objectives (although not all supporters care about all objectives), as

65
The average premium per individual is roughly $5000 and per family is roughly
$12,000 for group coverage. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Average Health Insurance
Premiums and Worker Contributions for Family Coverage, 1999-2008 (2008),
http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch=706. About 1/3 of the uninsured are individuals and the
other 2/3 are part of families. KFF Health Insurance Coverage in America, supra note
49, at 6. With an average family size of 3 in the U.S., those buying family plans will pay $4000
per person. U.S. Census Bureau, Fact Sheet: 2006-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year
Estimates, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). A
rough weighted estimate is $4300 per person. Yet, if average premiums decrease when more
healthy people enroll or if these healthy people pay lower than average premiums, these
estimates may be high; thus, I use $4000 to be conservative.
66
Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures,
Revisited, 20(2) Health Aff. 9, 12 (2001).
67
Jonathan Oberlander, Great Expectations - The Obama Administration and Health
Care Reform, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 321, 322 (2009).
68
C.f. Gruber, supra note 4 (outlining arguments for universal coverage in general, which
includes these three categories, among others).
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reflected in legislative records in Massachusetts69 and in proposals for a
mandate as part of national reform.70
While different, these objectives are often not completely distinct. Rather,
they are interrelated, interdependent, and undoubtedly blur at times. For
example, an individual mandate would serve paternalistic and efficiency ends
simultaneously if it compels people to behave in their own best interest and in
doing so results in greater efficiency. In fact, some scholars argue that
efficiency gains provide justification for paternalistic action.71 Similarly, a law
such as compulsory vaccination may result in an efficient outcome, protect the
vaccinated individual himself, and more equally distribute the cost of
preventing disease.
The purpose of disaggregating these three objectives with respect to the
individual mandate is not to argue that they are completely distinct. Rather,
it is to expose where the mandate will most likely fall short – in particular on
redistributive aims – if implemented in a fragmented health insurance
market.
A. Paternalism
Paternalism motivates law based on a belief that the government knows
what is best for an individual and, thus, will compel the individual to act in a
particular way for his or her “own good.”72 In doing so, policymakers
substitute their own preferences for an individual’s actuated preference.
Because paternalistic mandates attempt to compel individuals to make
choices that are in their own best interest, the paternalistic objective of the
mandate should only apply to uninsured who are in fact making an irrational
decision to be uninsured at a particular point in time. 73
There is a long history of mandates motivated by paternalism. Mandatory
use of seatbelts aims to protect drivers and passengers in a car from injury.
Mandatory waiting periods on contracts intend to protect someone from
agreeing in haste or under pressure to something that he will later regret.
Even mandates that are intended primarily to serve other objectives may be
partially motivated by paternalism. Compulsory vaccinations, while perhaps
primarily intended to promote herd immunity (an efficiency goal), also serve
to prevent an individual from being vulnerable, herself, to contracting polio or
69
See Health Care Access and Affordability Conference Committee Report
2006, http://www.mass.gov/legis/summary.pdf [hereinafter Conference Committee
Report].
70
See, e.g., Sen. Max Baucus, Call to Action: Health Reform 2009 (2008),
http://finance.senate.gov/healthreform2009/finalwhitepaper.pdf.
71
“Asymmetric paternalism” justifies paternalistic interventions so long as they help
irrational people avoid making costly mistakes while causing little or no harm to rational
people. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism,’ 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211, 1212 (2003); see also Eyal Zamir,
The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 Va. L. Rev. 229, 230 (1998) (efficiency analysis can
“provide[] a central justification for paternalism”).
72
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L.
Rev. 563 (1982) (discussing paternalism and retribution in the law).
73
Of course, policymakers could misjudge best interest and create a harmful paternalistic
intervention. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1543 (1998).
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measles.74 Automobile insurance mandates, while primarily aiming to ensure
victims of accidents access to remedy, also prevent an uninsured injurer from
personal liability for the cost of harm to others.
Scholars have long wrestled with the question of when, if ever, legal
paternalism is justified, making the case for a limited set of circumstances in
which it might be most appropriate. 75 The earliest defense was for laws
serving to protect groups of people who might not be able to make good
decisions for themselves, such as children and the mentally handicapped.76
More recently, behavioral psychologists and economists have justified broader
paternalistic intervention to remedy actual behavior that deviates from what
is considered fully-informed, rational behavior.77 That is, paternalism is
justified so long as it corrects for cases of systematic decision-making errors or
“bounded rationality.”78 Such errors might occur when a decision maker has
access to incomplete information, fails to understand complex information, or
is biased in a way that leads her to an irrational decision.79 Commonly
discussed types of bias include over-optimism, over-pessimism, or myopia in
the case of discord between immediate preferences and future preferences. 80
In such cases, paternalistic intervention would prompt an individual to make
the decision he would make if perfectly informed and rational.
The paternalistic objective for an individual health insurance mandate
concerns the mandate’s ability to convert the irrationally uninsured into
consumers of health insurance as a gateway to their own improved health and
greater financial security. 81 Individuals often make an irrational decision not
to buy health insurance, in large part due to individuals’ optimism bias with
respect to their future health, sometimes called the “superman effect,” that
prevents them from acknowledging their own vulnerability.82 Even with the
74
Some believe the risk of side effects from vaccination in fact outweigh the potential
benefits, making vaccination contrary to best-interest. For example, early polio vaccinations
had a high likelihood of infecting someone with the disease and, more recently, some are
concerned that vaccinations have caused an increased incidence of autism. See, e.g.,
Generation Rescue, http://www.generationrescue.org/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
75
Even for those who would not object to legal paternalism, mandates may be too strong
of a tool. Some advocate for “soft paternalism,” such as default rules, information disclosure
requirements, or cooling off periods to shape behavior by encouraging people to behave in
their own best interest rather than mandating they do so. Camerer et al., supra note 71, at
1224; see generally Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008) (promoting choice architecture to influence
choices with greater subtlety).
76
See Camerer et al., supra note 71, at 1213 (2003) (providing a brief history of
justification for paternalism); Zamir, supra note 71, at 229.
77
Camerer et al., supra note 71, at 1212.
78
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler explored such phenomena of
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self interest. Jolls et al., supra note 73;
see also Herbert A. Simon, Rationality and Administrative Decision Making, in Models of
Man: Social and Rational 196-207 (1957).
79
Jolls et al., supra note 73.
80
See Zamir, supra note 71, at 251.
81
See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 4, at 582. Cf. Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw,
True Security: Rethinking America’s Security 171-72 (1999) (explaining the purpose of
social health insurance as protecting against the dual risks of inadequate income and
“unacceptably steep” decline in living standards due to medical expenses).
82
Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for the Young Invincibles, Regulation,
Winter
2009-2010,
at
20,
available
at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv32n4/v32n4-4.pdf.
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best intentions, consumers may have difficulty estimating the complexity of
medical risk and thus undervalue the benefit of insurance.83 While health
insurance does not guarantee good medical care, research shows that the
inverse is true; the lack of health insurance results in worse care and health
outcomes for many, including increased mortality.84
Further, studies
demonstrate that uninsured Americans are at greater financial risk for
problems including insolvency, foreclosure, or bankruptcy.85 Thus, it is not
surprising that some supporters of the mandate would invoke it to correct for
decision-making errors that cause people not to purchase health insurance,
leaving themselves vulnerable to these types of health and financial risks.
However, the paternalistic justification for the mandate can only go so far.
Most importantly, as noted above, this paternalistic justification deals with a
subset of uninsured who are behaving irrationally. Assuming a portion of the
uninsured are currently making a rational decision not to purchase health
insurance because the cost of premiums exceed the likely benefit to them,
compelling them to buy insurance is arguably not in their self-interest and
thus, by definition, must be justified by something other than paternalism.86
In particular, in a market where someone can opt out in his twenties and buy
in without penalty in his thirties (so long as his health holds out), twenty yearolds might make a good bet to go bare. Furthermore, the paternalistic
potential of a mandate only reaches so far as the value of insurance policies
available and affordable to each individual. If policies do not provide
sufficient coverage, have cost-sharing levels that deter appropriate use of
health care, or provide low coverage limits so that the sick outspend their
policies, such policies might not achieve the health and financial security
desired by policymakers.87 In other words, their value might be low enough
that their benefits do not in fact outweigh their costs to some. Finally,
paternalism may be insufficient on its own to justify an individual mandate.
As noted above, legal scholars often justify paternalistic interventions based
upon the coexistence of other intentions, including efficiency goals.88 A
mandate aimed primarily at paternalistic goals may be more vulnerable to
83
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(2005),
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(2008).
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Of course, because some of the costs of medical care are unpredictable, it is difficult to
tell who is making a rational decision ex-ante. But, as discussed in Part II, with the irregular
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assertions of excessive intervention into personal choice, as evidenced by
resistance to mandates that are perceived as overly paternalistic, such as
mandated use of motorcycle helmets or mandated vaccination against the
human papillomavirus (HPV).89
B. Efficiency
Efficiency motivates law based upon a belief that such a law can increase
overall welfare so that, at least potentially, everyone can be made better off
according to his or her own preferences. It reflects a situation where the
government solves – by mandate – what the market cannot or has not solved.
Most of the discussion of the individual mandate to date has focused on its
efficiency potential, largely obscuring other objectives under the frame of
efficiency.
Mandates have often been used in the name of efficiency. They might, for
example, eliminate or reduce negative externalities. Consider the case of
motor vehicle insurance. Compulsory motor vehicle insurance laws emerged
in the early twentieth century as a way to address the problem of a motorist
unable to compensate victims of his negligence.90 Such laws compel solvency
so that injurers must internalize the costs they generate and, in theory,
efficiently invest in cost avoidance.91 Similarly, a mandate could solve a
collective action problem, where inefficiency results either because of “free
riding,” when an individual enjoys a shared (public) benefit without bearing
any costs of generating it, or when transaction costs thwart coordinated
action. A mandate can address both such problems. For example, in the case
of compulsory vaccination, any individual might be personally better off
avoiding the risks associated with vaccination so long as enough of his
community members are vaccinated to produce “herd immunity” and to stop
89
While mandatory motorcycle helmet laws offer potential efficiency gains (e.g., reduce
costs of emergency response, injury, and death from accidents), they were challenged as overly
paternalistic. The federal government eventually lifted financial penalties levied on states
without helmet laws, and the once universal laws have since been either repealed or limited to
apply to minors in two-thirds of states. See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Helmet
Use Laws (Mar. 2010), http://www.iihs.org/laws/HelmetUseOverview.aspx.
Even the
suggestion that a mandate is paternalistic may weaken its authority, as evinced by the case of
mandatory HPV vaccination. Some scholars make a compelling case that compulsory HPV
vaccination serves important public health goals. E.g., Sylvia Law, Human Papillomavirus
Vaccination, Private Choice, and Public Health, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1731 (2008); Kyra R.
Wagoner, Mandating the Gardasil Vaccine: A Constitutional Analysis, 5 Ind. Health L. Rev.
403 (2008). Opponents argue that an HPV vaccination mandate is overly paternalistic. E.g.,
Tracy Solomon Dowling, Mandating a Human Papillomavirus Vaccine: An Investigation into
Whether Such Legislation is Constitutional and Prudent, 34 Am. J. L. & Med. 65 (2008); Gail
Javitt et al., Assessing Mandatory HPV Vaccination: Who Should Call the Shots?, 36 J. L. Med.
& Ethics 384, 384 (2008). Whether objectors are actually offended by paternalism or
resistant to a mandate that they fear implicitly authorizes sexual activity by creating a
perception that sex is “safe” post-vaccination, they use rhetoric of paternalism to undermine
the validity of the mandate.
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Robert H. Jerry, II & Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law 953,
954 (LexisNexis 4th ed. 2007).
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transmission within the community.92 However, if too many in a community
free ride on others’ vaccinations, the community risks not achieving
immunity. When the benefit to all of herd immunity and subsequent
eradication of disease is greater than the cost of vaccination to the
unvaccinated, compulsory vaccination is efficient.93 Mandatory vaccinations
have been found constitutional under the police power to “protect the public
health and the public safety,” 94 even when decisions regarding individual
bodies and health were involved.95
By compelling everyone to be a consumer of insurance, the individual
health insurance mandate might serve several efficiency objectives that I will
discuss in turn. First, it may reduce insurance market inefficiency due to
adverse selection, regarded as the major market failure of insurance
markets.96 Second, it could eliminate inefficient use of care by the uninsured
in emergency rooms, the cost of which is often externalized (i.e., free-riding).97
Third, it can smooth medical care costs over an individual’s lifetime.
First, if the individual mandate successfully drives everyone to consume
insurance, it would eliminate adverse selection into health insurance markets.
This is the primary motivation economists cite for the individual mandate.98
Adverse selection is a problem of information asymmetry in insurance
markets.99 Insurers are concerned that those who seek insurance are more
likely than average to consume medical care because of something the buyers
know about their own health, family history, or behavior that insurers don’t
know and can’t easily discover.
Despite academic disagreement on the true extent of adverse selection
into markets, insurers behave as if it is a problem, particularly in the
individual market where insurers have greater fear of higher-risk individuals

92
See Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health
Imperative and Individual Rights, in Law in Public Health Practice 338, 339-40 (Richard
Alan Goodman et al. eds., 2007).
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Epidemiologic Rev. 265, 268 (1983). Vaccination efforts are credited with the eradication of
smallpox, near eradication of polio, and control of measles . In the United States, morbidity by
vaccine-preventable diseases has been reduced by 87-99%, depending on the disease. See
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seeking out insurance, which creates inefficiency. 100 Insurers have little
concern of adverse selection with respect to large, employer-sponsored group
insurance. Because these groups are formed for non-health reasons and
almost all employees enroll in coverage, the distribution of risk in them is
reasonably predictable and stable.101 Group risk becomes less predictable as a
group becomes smaller and thus the concern of adverse selection increases.102
In the individual market, every applicant is considered an unmitigated
adverse selection risk.
Insurers respond in two ways that drive up the cost of insurance and, as a
result, price buyers out. First, insurers charge a higher premium based upon a
rational presumption that higher-risk individuals will more often choose to
purchase insurance than lower-risk individuals. Even when the premium
accurately reflects average risk in the pool, unraveling will occur.103 Low-risk
individuals become more likely to exit the market as premium prices escalate
above what they perceive to be the value of health insurance, leaving more
high-risk insureds behind. Reflecting the then higher average medical costs
per person in the pool, insurers increase premiums, prompting lower-risk
insureds to drop coverage. At its logical extreme, this cycle results in the
adverse selection death spiral.104 This phenomenon is also called the
“standard lemons pricing effect,” or “the bad driving the good out of a
market.”105
Second, insurers counter adverse selection through risk selection and
classification practices to the extent permitted by state law,106 driving up
overhead costs. For example, insurers use medical underwriting to design and
price coverage based upon an individual’s projected risk.107 If a group or
100
Id.; see also Mark V. Pauly & Len M. Nichols, The Nongroup Health Insurance Market:
Short on Facts, Long On Opinions and Policy Disputes, Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) 325,
327 (Oct. 23, 2002) (arguing that adverse selection is clear in regulated nongroup markets and
less clear in unregulated ones but concluding that nonetheless, insurers’ fear of adverse
selection is real and drives underwriting and pricing behavior); Peter Siegelman, Adverse
Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 Yale. L.J. 1223, 1226 (2004)
(arguing that propitious selection, or the preference of risk averse who also tend to be more
self-preserving to buy insurance, balances out any adverse selection); Gruber, supra note 4, at
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101
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(1976) (discussing information asymmetry in competitive insurance markets).
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individual has high expected expenses, the insurer might charge a higher
premium or limit coverage through exclusion of certain pre-existing
conditions. If a person has already manifested an expensive disease, such as
liver disease, the insurer might deny coverage altogether.108 Insurers also use
sophisticated practices of marketing and benefit/network design to guide lowrisk and high-risk beneficiaries to different insurance products.109 That is,
they try to get customers to signal their own risk by self-segregating to
products on the basis of risk. For example, insurers may try to attract healthy
beneficiaries by offering fitness benefits, low-cost preventative care or a lowcost, high-deductible policy. On the flip side, by offering comprehensive
cancer coverage, an insurer might steer someone with a family history of
cancer to a more expensive policy.110
The use of such practices drives up administrative costs associated with
insurance, resulting in higher load factors (administrative costs plus profits)
in the small group and individual markets, where the risk of adverse selection
is higher and these practices are more intensively used, as discussed further in
Part IV.111 Estimates are that administrative costs account for as much as 3040 percent of premiums in the individual market in some states; 25-27
percent in the small group market; and only about 5-10 percent in large group
market.112 Because of these costs, some people who would like to buy
insurance are priced out of the market and some pay more than they would
for insurance in a more efficient market.
If the mandate does in fact eliminate adverse selection into markets by
discouraging low-risk individuals from avoiding or dropping health insurance
coverage, it might ameliorate some of this inefficiency. In particular,
elimination of adverse selection into markets will most likely reduce the
standard lemons pricing effect. Following a mandate, insurers can no longer
assume that applicants are disproportionately lemons. Rationally behaving
insurers in a competitive market would no longer charge “lemons” premiums,
based on assumption of higher-than-average risk enrollees, thus making
insurance affordable to more people.
While it is also possible that the mandate might reduce administrative
costs arising from risk selection practices, it is equally possible the individual
mandate might have no effect on or even drive up such costs. As the average
risk of applicants decreases post-mandate, it may be less profitable for
insurers to use underwriting and marketing to identify and avoid high risks.
If such practices were reduced or eliminated, administrative costs would
decline and insurance might be affordable for an even larger set of people.
That being said, there is good reason to believe the ability of the
individual mandate alone to decrease administrative costs may be limited (I’ll
argue below that a mandate that achieves the goal of health redistribution
unlocks potential for greater administrative efficiencies). While the mandate
eliminates adverse selection into the insurance market as a whole, the
potential for adverse selection among insurers or into different insurance
108
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products will remain. And insurers will have lost one signal as to who is highrisk once seeking out insurance can no longer be used as a signal that
someone has a higher-than-average risk. Thus, insurers may in fact have
more of an incentive to use marketing to attract healthier beneficiaries than
their competitors do and to use marketing or benefit design practices to
encourage applicants to self-segregate into different products according to
risk. There are not yet empirical studies measuring how the individual
mandate will affect the use of risk selection practices and thus the
administrative costs of insurance; such studies could illuminate the extent of
the costs resulting from adverse selection that might be addressed by a
mandate alone. What we do know, however, is that when certain practices for
identifying risk are banned, insurers tend to rely on other practices – both
legal and illegal – to identify higher-risk applicants.113
A second way the mandate might promote efficiency is by eliminating
externalized costs of care by the uninsured; this free-riding, while a muchdiscussed problem by the popular media, in reality likely offers limited
potential in terms of both efficiency and cost savings.114 In our current system,
we guarantee everyone access to emergency services regardless of ability to
pay under the Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act
(EMTALA).115 This security blanket might be causing some people to opt out
of insurance and use free resources for care knowing that if they are in urgent
need of medical attention, they can receive it.116 If an uninsured person
receives care in the emergency room and does not pay for this care, it is
considered “uncompensated” at the point of services, and the costs are folded
into premiums paid by the insured.117 Estimates of uncompensated care costs
range from $30 billion to $56 billion per year in the U.S.118
Elimination of use of ER care by the uninsured is widely cited as a reason
for an individual mandate.119 The theory is that if the uninsured could access
care in cheaper clinical settings, they could get the same or better services less
expensively. In reality, studies conflict on how much of the use of ER care is
in fact inefficient, how much efficiency gain is possible, and how much
efficiency loss might result from clinical waste in routine services used by the
newly insured.120
More importantly, this potential of the mandate to reduce the use of ER
care by the uninsured is typically erroneously framed as offering potential for
overall cost savings due to a mandate. Even if shifting care away from the ER
113
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by increasing the number of insured is efficient, it is unlikely to save money.
In fact, studies have shown that once the uninsured have insurance, they will
use more care than before, which will increase overall health spending by as
much as two times.121 Some of this increase might reflect greater inefficiency
due to moral hazard – overuse of care once a third-party payer is subsidizing
the consumption.122 Some of this increase is also a result of people getting
access to much-needed care that they couldn’t get before. Even though
insuring everyone might lead to better health outcomes and some reduction of
inefficient spending, it will increase health care spending overall, at least in
the short term.
Finally, the mandate can help smooth an individual’s spending for health
care over a lifetime. As discussed above, Americans today go to extreme
measures to pay for medical care and sometimes end up filing for bankruptcy
or in other financial distress.123 Health insurance can prevent such problems
by enabling individuals to smooth medical spending in two ways. First,
insurance might serve as a way for an individual to borrow from his future self
for care needed today. If someone has a skiing accident this year that costs
her $30,000 for medical care, her insurance will pay for this care, but such
payment can be conceptualized as a loan from future premium payments she
will make in healthy, accident-free years. On the flip side, it might be possible
that she pays $5000 a year for the next fifty years before she needs any
expensive care. In this case, her years of paying excess premiums (as
compared to her consumption) might be seen as “savings” for this care when
old. Thus, efficiency may result from intrapersonal redistribution of health
costs over a lifetime.
In sum, primarily by converting the uninsured into consumers of health
insurance, many see the individual mandate as a tool to achieve efficiency
gains from reducing adverse selection, enabling more efficient use of care, and
smoothing health care costs over a lifetime.
C. Health Redistribution and Solidarity
Finally, redistribution - the focus of the remainder of this article –
motivates law that promotes a reordering of resources among people. The
individual mandate can serve a redistributive objective by compelling the
healthy or lucky to buy insurance to help finance care for the sick or unlucky.
This redistribution by mandate, which I call “health redistribution,” differs
from income redistribution, a more common conception of redistribution
from the wealthy to the poor.
As subsection 2 examines, health redistribution can generate a number of
benefits – political, pragmatic, and moral. For example, through health
redistribution, the mandate might enhance the political feasibility of funding
universal insurance coverage, address distributive justice concerns with
minimal labor distortion, and unlock further insurance market efficiencies.
121
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For many, though, the critical importance of the mandate’s ability to promote
health redistribution is to institutionalize a more solidaristic regime of health
insurance, where access to health care is divorced from factors other than
need.124
1. Health Redistribution
The final policy objective some hope individual mandate will serve is
“health redistribution.” In essence, the mandate compels the healthy to
finance care for those sicker than themselves.
Because the mandate operates in insurance markets, its ability to effect
health redistribution depends on health insurance as a mechanism for risk
pooling. When in risk pools together, the healthy and sick can pay for
insurance in a way that the healthy majority subsidizes premiums and medical
care for the sick or injured minority.125
While paternalism and efficiency objectives rely to a large degree on
converting the uninsured into consumers of health insurance, the
redistributive objective relies as much on the mandate’s ability to influence
the healthy as potential financiers of care for the sick. This influence over the
uninsured reaches beyond what paternalism would justify because the optouts’ purchase serves another’s interest, rather than self-interest. It also
reaches beyond what efficiency objectives alone would justify to the extent the
goal is shifting dollars from one person to another without increasing the total
pie.
Health redistribution can occur in two different ways within the structure
of health insurance. First, ex-ante, purchase of insurance by the healthy
“financiers” can make it easier for everyone to afford insurance premiums.
When more low-risk individuals join a risk pool, the cost of premiums in that
pool can be reduced for all members.126 Imagine a hypothetical risk pool with
two people. The first has expected risk of $8000 and the second of $5000.
The average expected cost in the pool is $6500, and each person will be
charged a $6500 premium (plus overhead costs) if all members of the pool
pay the average price. Now, imagine a voluntary opt-out with an expected risk
of $2000 joins this pool. The average expected cost drops to $5000. If all
pool members share risk equally, the individual with expected costs of $2000
and the one with $8,000 each pay $5000 this year. In other words, the
surplus, as discussed above, that the financiers pay in premiums beyond their
own expected costs can subsidize care for those in need of it and lead to lower
premiums for others in the pools they join. Support for ex-ante risk pooling
that smoothes premium costs among insureds has come in and out of vogue in
the American insurance system, as discussed further below, and garners more
controversy than the notion of ex-post pooling, which people tend to more
readily identify as the type of redistribution we could expect through
insurance.127
124
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Second, universal participation helps to distribute wealth ex-post to
anyone who experiences a medical loss in any one year to make them whole
for that loss. Ex-ante, everyone bears some risk of incurring medical costs,
but it is not clear who will actually suffer the loss in any one year.128 In other
words, imagine we all pay equally into an insurance pool in a year, not
knowing to whom this money will be distributed in the form of medical care.
Those who are made “poorer” by sickness in any one year will have resources
distributed to them to cushion such a decrease in wealth. Imagine in the
hypothetical above that the person with estimated risk of $5000 were in a
biking accident and actually incurred a $10,000 bill for medical care. Even
though $10,000 is more than he was projected to incur in costs this year, expost he receives payment out of the pool to make him whole for his bad luck.
Thus, regardless of the fact that some people will be financiers, or net payers,
in any one year (the healthy or lucky) and others will be net beneficiaries in
any one year (the sick or unlucky), everyone pays in and everyone has equal
opportunity to draw out funds for care. The mandate requires more people to
participate in this type of ex-post sharing of losses.
Health redistribution is normatively complex, and might concern even
those who broadly support redistributive goals. First, health redistribution
can be regressive. Imagine a mandate requires every American to pay an
equal amount for insurance, regardless of income. By doing so, it promotes
horizontal equity (the notion that people with the same income should
contribute equally) but simultaneously violates principles of vertical equity
(the corollary that those with greater income should contribute more). The
result is that the healthy poor could subsidize the sick wealthy, a result many
would find troubling.
Even in a national social insurance system, as in Canada or the UK, where
universal care is funded through progressive taxes, it is still possible that the
healthy poor or middle class help fund care for the wealthy sick. Nonetheless,
horizontal and vertical equity concerns are addressed more seamlessly in such
social insurance systems where all citizens are provided access to medical care
that is financed through proportional or progressive forms of taxation.
Everyone who is taxable contributes. Those who earn the same pay the same
amount so long as the tax law treats them similarly (horizontal equity), and
those earn more will pay more (vertical equity).
Because seeking universal health care through mandate does not have a
built-in mechanism to address vertical equity concerns, a policy built upon
mandates must rely upon tax-based subsidies to ameliorate its regressive
nature. In fact, as advocated by health economist Jon Gruber, it would be
imprudent and perhaps infeasible to implement an individual mandate
without some degree of income-based subsidies (a “mandate plus subsidies”
approach). 129 Doing so could mean asking some people to pay more for health
insurance than they earn in income or to make undesirable tradeoffs in the
name of compliance, such as eschewing food, shelter, or safety. Subsidies
raised through taxes could be used to cushion costs for lower income insureds,
and thus make health reform by mandate less regressive in nature. In fact,
128
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Massachusetts subsidized the purchase of insurance up to 300 percent of
FPL,130 and the Health Reform Law will provide for subsidies up to as high as
400 percent of FPL.131
Nonetheless, even with such subsidies, the mandate is still prone to be
regressive anywhere above subsidy levels. Imagine someone earning 500
percent of FPL pays the same premium as someone earning 600 percent of
FPL. The lower income individual still pays a higher percent of his income for
health insurance. This result proves difficult to avoid unless health insurance
were provided to all Americans and funded entirely through proportional or
progressive taxation.
A second concern with health redistribution, as opposed to income
redistribution, is that the weight of health redistribution lies of the shoulders
of the financiers, who are likely healthy and, for the most part, young.
There are good reasons to believe it is not fair to ask the young to bear the
costs of care for those older and sicker than themselves. Nearly 30 percent of
the uninsured are between nineteen and twenty-nine years old.132 Many of
these uninsured are making a decision not to buy insurance because they are
at low risk of incurring medical care costs. In the worst of cases, they can
access emergency room care even if uninsured because of legal requirements
under EMTALA, as discussed above. Many are not earning particularly high
salaries. Further, they are at a point where it is critical to invest in their
education and careers. The cost of insurance might thwart opportunities for
higher education and might deter the young from careers where health
benefits are not standard, such as small businesses and start-ups.
We might address such concerns in part by allowing these “invincibles” to
comply with a mandate in less burdensome ways or by limiting the portion of
the costs of reform we impose on them. Accordingly, we could create plans for
the young that are tailored for low-risk individuals, such as the young adult
health plans offered in Massachusetts, which have lower premiums in
exchange for higher deductibles. We could also allow them to stay on their
parents’ insurance longer, which has been permitted in Massachusetts and
some other states and included in the Health Reform Law.133 Alternately,
Tom Baker and Peter Siegelman propose reinvigorating a form of insurance
from nineteenth century life insurance called the Tontine.134 Tontines entice
young invincibles to purchase insurance by offering a cash bonus for those
who buy insurance and use little or no medical care during the policy term.135
They benefit from coverage if necessary and, if not, they get a premium rebate
to reduce the cost of insurance.
Yet, this burden on the young might be less troubling if framed
differently. For example, it could be seen as participation in a cross130
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generational subsidy; in essence, the young subsidize their parents’ insurance.
Further, their participation helps to stabilize a regime of more moderate
premiums for older insureds that they will enjoy as adults, so their higher
payments today could be seen as forced savings for health insurance for their
future selves. Finally, the tradeoff of allowing healthy young to pay less for
insurance, or to qualify for a rebate when healthy, is diminished potential for
health redistribution. It is in essence a form of fragmentation, as discussed
below, that thwarts goals of health redistribution.
With health redistribution’s less appealing attributes of being regressive
and burdening the young, why do some advocate for it? The next section
answers this question by probing the particular benefits of health
redistribution – political, pragmatic, and moral – and whether such benefits
outweigh these potential burdens on the poor and young.
2. Benefits from Health Redistribution
a. Political and Pragmatic Benefits of Health Redistribution
The mandate’s ability to promote health redistribution could generate
both political and pragmatic benefits.
First, health redistribution may be necessary politically in order to raise
sufficient funding for health reform. Subsidizing low-income uninsureds is
estimated to cost over $80 billion per year.136 With the unpopularity of
increased taxation, relying on it alone to cover subsidies of $80 billion a year
may make reform politically impossible. Successful health redistribution
enables some subsidization to occur more discreetly within the bounds of risk
pools because participation of the healthy lowers the average cost of
premiums. By doing so, it can lessen the subsidies that must be funded
through taxes.
Second, some believe health redistribution might offer a less costly way to
address distributive justice concerns.137 If we conceptualize health as a
component of wealth separate from income, we might want to tax it separately
for equity reasons.138 Income wealth is a crude categorization of wealth and
the primary one that we tax. But it might not be a sufficient measure of
overall wealth. Imagine two people earn equal income but one has a
congenital heart defect that limits his energy and mobility and requires
expensive medical care over his entire life. It is reasonable to believe that the
sick individual is worse off than the healthy one, despite their equal earned
income. Because health can be an important determinant of overall welfare,
some advocate treating health as a separate category of wealth that should be
136
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separately taxed; the mandate functions as a flat health tax for such
purposes.139
Even if health is not considered morally distinct from other core needs,
such as shelter, nutrition, or a healthy environment, and thus has no inherent
claim to differential treatment, health redistribution may still be appealing as
a way to respond to distributive justice concerns while minimizing labor
distortion.140 Professor Einer Elhauge argues that there are fewer reasons to
oppose egalitarian distribution of health care because it meets a variable need
with less harm to productive incentives than is true for other goods.141 This is
because, first, people do not want to be sick and thus will not try to remain
sick to continue getting benefits, which are distributed in the form of medical
care.142 And second, there is little bureaucracy necessary to determine who is
deserving of benefits as need is determined as part of the provision of medical
care.143 Thus, health redistribution provides a more efficient way to take care
of the poor or vulnerable, and in doing so it may also increase overall labor
productivity to the extent healthier people are able to contribute more to
society.144
In line with this argument, health redistribution may be appealing if we
believe health tracks more closely to ability to earn income than actual earned
income does. If our distributive goal is to provide for people unable to provide
for themselves, health redistribution might be a more precise way to distribute
resources to those unable to earn sufficient income because they are sick or
injured, rather than to those who earn little income by choice.
Finally, by achieving broad health redistribution, the mandate can unlock
significant efficiency in insurance markets through more comprehensive
elimination of adverse selection than can be achieved through a mandate that
does not promote broad health redistribution. This is because broad risk
pooling – not the mandate on its own – is what unlocks part of the efficiency
gains people anticipate might result from the mandate’s effect on adverse
selection.
As discussed in Part II.B, high administrative costs arise when insurers try
to select out healthy customers and differentially treat higher-risk ones, and
the mandate alone will not eliminate such sorting. There are two ways to
solve this inefficient and expensive sorting that arises out of informational
asymmetry between insurers and customers.
First, assuming it were
possible, we could provide insurers perfect information on every applicant and
allow them to use such information so that insurers could underwrite all
applicants with perfect accuracy and little effort. Imagine this approach were
possible and that the insurance market were to become more efficient because
insurers are able to perfectly gauge an individual’s expected risk at no cost.
This market would limit an individual’s premium costs to his own projected
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risk of sickness in the coming year.145 The benefit of this type of perfect
actuarially-rated system is that the majority of people (who are low-risk) can
obtain health insurance for the lowest possible premiums. The problem with
this system is that higher-risk individuals bear the full cost of their own risk.
There is less smoothing of premiums over a lifetime and among beneficiaries.
This approach opts to leave some people uninsured (the more vulnerable or
high-risk populations who will face prohibitively high insurance premiums) in
return for low cost insurance and an absence of coercion for the majority of
insured, who are low-risk.146 Such a result – while efficient – would likely not
appeal to many who support the mandate, even those who would claim their
support is in the name of increased efficiency. Furthermore, this approach
would require providing genetic information and family health history to
insurers in a way that is likely unacceptable to Americans and, not
surprisingly, has been prohibited legislatively.147
Alternatively, and perhaps the only real option in light of our present
inability to provide insurers with perfect information even if we wanted to do
so, we could blind insurers to risk altogether so that they charge every enrollee
the same premium. This approach is health redistribution at an extreme,
completely divorcing insurance pricing from individual risk. In a system of
perfect health redistribution, we would pool all risk and charge everyone the
same prices for insurance (or in a modified system, charge differential prices
based upon standardized rules for a limited and objectively-defined
population, such as providing 19-25 year olds plans at lower prices). Insurers
would no longer benefit from underwriting and risk selection and presumably
would stop engaging in these expensive practices. Thus, to the extent the
mandate is able to draw people into markets that promote broad health
redistribution, it can better unlock health insurance market efficiencies. The
mandate’s redistributive and efficiency objectives become inextricably linked
because achieving the redistributive objective is a gateway to enhancing
efficiency.

b. Solidarity though Health Redistribution
Finally, many scholars and policymakers have supported health
redistribution as a means to institutionalize a more solidaristic regime of

145
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health insurance in the U.S. 148 Solidarity manifests when a particular goal is
deemed important enough to warrant a coordinated approach to achieving it,
even if some people may, in the end, contribute more than they, as
individuals, receive in return.149 Solidarity depends upon people acting from
more than simple self-interest, a motivation scholars have identified as “otherregarding behavior” or “altruism.”150 With respect to health, the goal is often
described as ensuring everyone in the community who needs medical care has
equitable access to it.151 Professor Deborah Stone notes that “the ideal of the
solidarity principle is that we should strive to distribute medical care
according to medical need and to limit the influence of ability to pay, past
consumption of medical care, or expected future consumption.”152
This section explores how some supporters of the mandate see it as the
key to creating a more solidaristic system of health insurance through health
redistribution. The final subsection explores whether creating a system of
broad health redistribution might endogenously begin to redefine the level of
mutual aid Americans expect to give and receive within a health insurance
system.
i. Comparative, historical, political, and popular support for solidarity
Solidarity is a value most industrialized nations identify as key to their
systems of health insurance. Uwe Reinhardt describes solidarity as the
foundation of social insurance institutions: “In Europe, as in Canada, that
social ethic is based on the principle of social solidarity. It means that health
care should be financed by individuals on the basis of their ability to pay, but
should be available to all who need it on roughly equal terms. The regulations
imposed on health care in these countries are rooted in this overarching
principle.”153 Likewise, Richard Saltman similarly calls solidarity the “core
animating principle” of European social health insurance systems.154
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While not always the dominant or explicit value behind policies in the
United States, a desire to collectivize certain risks does influence how we have
organized important and highly popular American social welfare programs.
Take the example of Social Security. The Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA) mandates that all workers contribute FICA, or payroll taxes, for Social
Security.155 These dollars are pooled and then redistributed to eligible
applicants (primarily the disabled and those over sixty-five years old)
according to a benefits calculation.156 This benefits determination serves a
progressive redistributive function so that workers with low earnings will have
sufficient income for retirement. The lowest 1/5 of earners has a ratio of
benefits-to-taxes almost three times as high as the top 1/5 of earners.157 We
(or the working majority of us) all are compelled to pay into a system of
savings, knowing that we may eventually receive less than we have
contributed over our lifetime, and perhaps acknowledging the universal
importance of income security in retirement. Our contribution ensures that
both we and the members of our community will enjoy such income security.
Professor Bill Sage recently reflected that even though solidarity may not
be the most fashionable of American values, it nonetheless weaves through
American health policy.158 American health insurance has early roots in more
solidaristic models, and while the industry has moved further away from
collective responsibility over the past fifty years, notions of solidarity still
underlie key elements of American health insurance.159 On the private
insurance side, group health insurance pools risk among all members of the
group, and mandated benefit laws promote broader risk pooling for certain
conditions by requiring all insurance policies issued in a state cover a
particular condition, as discussed further in III.B.1 below. And the patchwork
of social insurance programs discussed in Part I above (e.g., Medicare,
Medicaid, SCHIP) are based on the notion of ensuring some Americans access
to medical care, regardless of ability to pay.
Many have voiced support for the mandate as a tool that can reignite a
more broad-based solidaristic health insurance system in the U.S. Scholars
have recognized mandated insurance as a possible means to expand risk pools
and spread health risks more collectively.160
In recent debates, policymakers regularly invoke the value of solidarity in
support of the mandate. The Conference Committee report from the
Massachusetts reform effort explained: “Requiring those who can afford
health insurance to purchase coverage is fair . . . . By requiring everyone to
have coverage, those who are healthy and currently uninsured will enter the
insurance risk pool and thus help to stabilize the cost of premiums for the
currently insured.”161 In his speech to Congress on health reform on
155
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September 9, 2009, which some credit with reigniting a then diminished
support for reform, President Obama spoke of late Senator Ted Kennedy and
notions of solidarity as he asked Americans to act together to reform health
insurance:
“That large-heartedness – that concern and regard for the plight of others
– is not a partisan feeling . . . . It, too, is part of the American character. Our
ability to stand in other people's shoes. A recognition that we are all in this
together; that when fortune turns against one of us, others are there to lend a
helping hand . . . .
This has always been the history of our progress. In 1933, when over half
of our seniors could not support themselves and millions had seen their
savings wiped away, there were those who argued that Social Security would
lead to socialism. But the men and women of Congress stood fast, and we are
all the better for it. In 1965, when some argued that Medicare represented a
government takeover of health care, members of Congress, Democrats and
Republicans, did not back down. They joined together so that all of us could
enter our golden years with some basic peace of mind.”162
Obama’s appeal invokes the value of solidarity by asking Americans to
stand in others’ shoes to recognize a common plight and to help create
security for everyone against the costs of poor health.
The American populace has expressed willingness to act in solidarity with
respect to health reform. Americans are clearly concerned with the high
numbers of uninsured in the country. A recent poll reports that 94 percent of
people think it is a very or somewhat serious problem that many Americans
do not have health insurance.163 And while the American public has at times
hesitated to embrace health solidarity because of resistance to interpersonal
redistribution,164 this same poll suggests that this trend may be shifting.
Nearly 60 percent of those polled said they were willing to pay higher taxes so
that all Americans have insurance “they can’t lose no matter what.”165
ii. Normative bases for solidarity and policy design implications
Advocates for a more solidaristic health insurance system might root their
support in several different normative justifications.166 Each of these
justifications would lead to a different vision of how solidarity translates into
policy, including who and what types of medical care are included within the
bounds of a system of solidarity.
Some believe that health is inherently special, and medical care should be
treated as a merit good, rather than allocated by the market based upon
162
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ability and willingness to pay.167 Variations of this argument include, for
example, that health is necessary to exercise rights of citizenship,168 for
achieving personal satisfaction or happiness,169 or to obtain reasonable
opportunities in life.170 In other words, some believe health is a foundational
need and for this reason support a norm of more equitable access to medical
care.171 This view might align with a Rawlsian conception of factors that
should not limit access to benefits of society.172
Alternatively, others experience moral guilt from allowing another person
to suffer173 and thus believe we should act in solidarity out of “empathyaltruism.”174 For example, as evinced by the existence of EMTALA, many of us
would not allow someone to bleed to death after a car accident because he is
uninsured or unable to pay for care. A mandate could thus serve to prevent
some from suffering from lack of care and others from experiencing distress
because of such suffering.175
These above two justifications would lead to a fairly unbounded
conception of health solidarity and thus a broad system of health
redistribution. In other words, such views would support a solidaristic system
where we collectively fund treatment for sickness or injury for anyone,
regardless of the source or cause, if the sickness or injury is an impediment to
certain basic opportunities, or if it causes suffering. Yet proponents of each of
these views would have a different priority for spending health care dollars.
For example, someone who subscribes to health as a means to life’s
opportunities might prefer to address health problems that tend to affect the
young with a world of opportunity ahead. They might believe we should first
focus on vaccination and well-child care before addressing, for example,
diseases of the elderly. In contrast, the empathy altruist would want to spend
dollars to alleviate the greatest or most visible medically-related suffering.
Finally, a luck egalitarian might support solidarity out of a belief that no
one should suffer the arbitrary, expensive misfortune of poor health, which
disproportionately burdens a small proportion of all Americans.176
Circumstances that evoke solidarity for a luck egalitarian could be a result of
167
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one’s underlying health endowment (e.g., congenital problems or bad genes)
or of idiosyncratic health status (e.g., resulting from a car accident). Medical
care costs are distributed so that in any year a small number of people
experience tremendously high medical expenses, while most people
experience little to no expenses.177 One percent of the population accounts for
over 25 percent of total health care spending in a year ($43,000 per person in
2005), and ten percent of the population are responsible for almost 70
percent of all medical spending in a year.178 Yet this population of top
spenders changes from year to year. One study estimated that 62 percent of
the top ten percent of spenders in 1996 were not in the top ten percent in
1998.179 A luck egalitarian would believe that because any of us might be a top
spender in any one year and often for reasons out of our control, we should
share communally in the costs of this arbitrary and significant risk.180
However, luck egalitarianism must lead to a bounded sense of solidarity
because notions of solidarity would end when someone chooses to act in a way
that increases her health risk. Poor health could be caused by factors ranging
from those completely out of an individual’s control (e.g., genetics) to those
that may be more in his control (e.g., smoking, drinking, eating poorly). A
luck egalitarian might be willing to act in solidarity to help someone with a
congenital disease or genetic problem. Yet, if two people are born with the
same level of risk but the first eats fast food for lunch every day and develops
heart disease and the second does not, the luck egalitarian might believe it is
unfair to ask the healthy person to subsidize medical care for the fast-food
eater’s heart disease. Similarly, if one person chooses to live in an area where
health care is expensive (e.g., Boston) and another chooses to live in an area
where it is not (e.g., Minnesota), they might deem it unfair to ask the person
in Minnesota to subsidize the one in Boston’s expensive care.
Under a luck-egalitarian’s policy, some people would thus bear more cost
than others to the extent they make choices that increase the total overall
medical care costs for society. Their behavior may be contrary to underlying
justifications for redistribution. If we were to deem that certain actions, such
as living in an expensive medical care locale or eating poorly, were to
disqualify someone from enjoying the full benefits of others’ solidarity, we
could design insurance plans that charge higher deductibles or premiums if
someone engages in a particular risk-increasing behavior. By doing so, we
both express social disapproval of certain behaviors or choices and
simultaneously might deter them.
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On the other hand, the determinants of such life “choices” or behaviors
that increase medical risk may in fact be more complex. Studies on these
“social determinants of health” have established that factors such as lack of
education, poverty, and characteristics of one’s environment are highly
correlated with poor health behaviors.181 Because these factors are largely out
of one’s control and make it more likely someone will smoke or eat unhealthy
foods, even a luck egalitarian might not want to penalize this person for
damage to his health resulting from such actions.
Thus, even those who support health redistribution as a means to
promoting health solidarity might disagree on how to define what types of
medical risks must be shared within the bounds of a system of solidarity,
depending on their underlying normative belief for why health solidarity is
important. Although the particular place where we bound solidarity is a
complex consideration, it does not bear on the underlying value many see for
the individual mandate in terms of promoting solidarity. What is important is
that under a solidarity-based system, such limits would be agreed upon
communally, rather than delegated to and determined by insurers on the basis
of profitability.
iii. Institutional construction of solidarity
This final section briefly explores the notion that implementation of a
system of health redistribution, if successful, can endogenously grow solidarity
– an idea I will return to briefly in Part IV, even though a full discussion of
this idea is beyond the scope of this article. In other words, the question I
pose is whether an individual mandate – if able to achieve broad health
redistribution and provide all Americans access to medical care when in
need– can grow democratic legitimacy for the notion of collectivizing risk in
the name of more equitable access to medical care. Long-term and strong
public support for similar redistributive programs of shared risk and social
benefit, such as Medicare and Social Security, suggest that the notion is at
least plausible. If true, the mandate’s ability to promote broad health
redistribution might in fact enhance its long-term legitimacy and
sustainability.
It is perhaps paradoxical to consider compelling someone to act in
solidarity by mandate. Even if a majority would choose to act in solidarity, the
participation of the oppositional minority is still necessary for the mandate to
achieve its objectives. Use of a mandate coerces the minority in the name of
the majority’s collective desire to achieve such objectives.
But longer term, the need for such coercion might diminish if a mandate
that institutionalizes solidarity is able to shift norms that have been
established by traditions of market-based distribution and individualism
toward norms of collective responsibility; that is to say, a mandate might
redefine what we consider individual versus collective responsibility.
Professor Tom Baker calls this the “social construction of responsibility.”182
For example, establishing Medicare and requiring participation in it might
181
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gradually change how we determine who is responsible for providing health
care for the elderly and might even result in growing favor for the program
over time.183 The institutions may need to come first, and broad support may
follow.
At the most basic level, it is reasonable to believe that an individual
mandate, because of required high participation, is likely to create investment
in the program among participants and other interested parties.184 Such
investment could work to the benefit of the individual mandate if the invested
parties are satisfied with the benefits the mandate generates and want to
preserve such benefits. For example, in Massachusetts, aligning all interest
groups around the initial health reform, aimed at enhancing coverage by
individual mandate, has lubricated discussion of cost-cutting efforts, which
had historically proven quite thorny, because such efforts are now perceived as
necessary to preserve progress made to date on reform.185 The concentration
of interests may have also prompted the media spotlight on anti-competitive
behavior among the Commonwealth’s insurers and providers that contributed
to rising medical costs in the state.186 With such problems exposed, invested
parties have the knowledge and incentive to address them to preserve the
fiscal sustainability of reform.187
But is it possible that a system of collective participation and mutual aid
could do more than motivate coordinated political action because of sunk
costs? Could it enhance the long-term legitimacy of sharing risk? In
describing social health insurance programs in Europe, Richard Saltman calls
them a “way of life,” engendering great loyalty, suggesting there is at least
some level of attachment to, if not deeper connection with, European social
insurance programs.188
Scholars of the sociology of insurance and of the welfare state contend
that the way we design our insurance institutions bears greatly on the way
that we think about suffering and responsibility189 and can enhance the
perceived legitimacy of using of social programs and insurance to spread
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economic risks.190
Tom Baker calls this the “use of risk in the social
construction of reality.”191 He writes:
“The development of insurance institutions shapes, in turn, what
is imaginable about the meaning of participation in insurance
institutions. The more that insurance institutions adapt to satisfy
self-interest, the more the satisfaction of self interest will seem to
be the natural role of insurance institutions and the more farfetched the idea of using insurance to achieve solidarity . . . . The
debate over the government’s role in the U.S. health insurance is,
in significant part, a debate over the nature of health insurance:
does it exist to protect me and mine, or does it serves a greater
good?192”
Deborah Stone suggests that insurance not only shapes our notions of
insurance but also shapes larger culture and behavior: “Insurance is a social
institution that helps define norms and values in political culture, and
ultimately shapes how citizens think about issues of membership, community,
responsibility, and moral obligation.”193 Conversely, Jonathan Simon suggests
that actuarial practices that limit risk pooling “construct groups along
dimensions that erode the basis of collective identity and action.”194
By this logic, the mandate, if successful at health redistribution, might
affirm a conception of health insurance as an institution where all should
share collectively in risk to achieve a social good. The institution itself might
construct a reality in which it is more likely for someone to favor (or at least
not oppose) health redistribution.
Gillian Lester’s recent article considers whether universal social welfare
programs might be able to actuate altruism endogenously in a way that would
ease constraints on redistribution.195 She considers possible mechanisms
through which a universal program might do so, based upon its ability to
create the conditions that studies in psychology and economics have identified
that tend to invoke altruism.196 Altruism might grow, for example, from a
sense of reciprocal benefit from, and stewardship over, a shared program197 or
from “empathy-altruism,” when someone identifies with needs of another,
which is most likely to occur when both people are members of a salient
group.198
In contrast, using means-tested programs and income taxes to effect
redistribution may be solidarity-diminishing over time. Sociologist Gösta
190
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Esping-Anderson writes that means-tested programs draw a line between the
haves, who are self-sufficient, and the have-nots, who are not.199 There is no
longer one community working toward a goal but rather a clear distinction
between those in need and the others who pay to fulfill their need.200 These
types of distinctions create potential for devolution into stratification and
negative stereotypes, such as the “Welfare Queen,” that erode solidarity and
may in fact threaten the legitimacy of social welfare programs in the longterm, as the Welfare Queen did for Aid For Dependent Children (AFDC).201
Early public surveys hint at the possibility of slowly shifting norms in
Massachusetts. Public support of the individual mandate has grown from 52
percent in 2006, when the reform was passed, to 58 percent in 2008, postimplementation.202 Support for the overall reform grew over the same period
from 61 to 69 percent.203 While the cause of this increased support is not
clear, it is possible residents are growing comfortable with the idea of
belonging to a shared system under the mandate.204 Thus, by collectivizing
risk among all Americans and providing, in return, access to care when in
need, it is possible to conceive that the individual mandate might catalyze a
more solidaristic way of conceptualizing health insurance. Over time, doing
so might grow public legitimacy and durability of a system of universal
coverage reliant on interpersonal redistribution.
D. Compliance and Measuring Success
Evaluations of the individual mandate have relied upon percent
compliance, which is a measure of the number of uninsured converted into
consumers of health insurance, to gauge whether the mandate is successful.205
When equating compliance with success, most experts project that an
individual mandate will in fact succeed,206 as evinced by results in
Massachusetts, where three years into implementation of the mandate nearly
98% of the state’s residents are insured.207
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While compliance is an important measure of success, it is an insufficient
measure of the mandate’s ability to achieve the three different potential
objectives, explored in this proceeding Part. 208 Compliance primarily
measures the mandate’s impact on uninsured as consumers (or nonconsumers) of health insurance. Thus, it can at best reflect success on
objectives that rely primarily upon the mandate’s ability to convert the
uninsured into consumers of health insurance.
Paternalism and efficiency objectives depend largely on the mandate’s
ability to convert the uninsured into consumers of insurance. This is not to
say that the mandate’s influence over financiers and ability to promote health
redistribution has no bearing on these objectives, because it certainly does. It
is only to say that if the mandate were to lead to universal coverage,
paternalism and efficiency objectives would be met with some reasonable level
of success.
High compliance serves as a reasonable proxy for paternalistic goals, so
long as insurance coverage provides sufficient health and financial protection
to make purchasing it of value to the insured. With a significant and growing
problem of underinsurance, as the cost of insurance increases, it will be more
difficult for insurance to provide such protection as some would hope. For
example, if a low-income purchaser buys a high deductible policy, where he
must pay the first $5000 in expenses out-of-pocket, it is possible he won’t be
able to afford to access medical care or will face financial problems if he does
obtain necessary care and is billed for the $5000 deductible. Likewise, if a
policy carves out certain conditions or caps coverage at low limits, the same
may occur. To the extent these problems are exacerbated by fragmentation
and not just by problems inherent in the high cost of medical care translated
into insurance premiums, paternalistic objectives might also face problems
due to the fragmentation discussed below.209
Compliance also provides some (albeit imperfect) measure of the ability of
the individual mandate to increase efficiency. The link between compliance
and increased efficiency is more tenuous because efficiency first relies upon
individuals becoming consumers of insurance but also relies in part on
behavioral shifts by insureds and insurers.
For example, to reduce
inefficiencies from inappropriate use of ER care, the newly insured must use
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clinical care when more efficient.210 Similarly, perfect compliance eliminates
the possibility of adverse selection into health insurance markets and thus
should eliminate the standard lemons pricing effect, so long as insurers
respond to the lower average risk of insureds by lowering the price of the
average premium accordingly.
Compliance, on the other hand, is a necessary yet entirely insufficient
measure of the mandate’s ability to promote health redistribution.
Compliance is a precondition; at the most basic level, everyone must
participate so that insurance can be used as the mechanism to pool risk for
everyone. Yet compliance entirely fails to gauge the impact of the mandate on
the uninsured as financiers of care. Understanding whether the mandate’s
influence over potential financiers does in fact result in effective health
redistribution relies upon understanding how well the financiers pool risk and
fund medical costs for those sicker then themselves.
Thus, reliance so far in the literature on compliance to measure the
individual mandate’s success has particularly obscured the mandate’s
potential, and I argue certain failure, to promote redistributive objectives and
capture the anticipated benefits from doing so. In Part III of this paper, I will
show that the fragmentation of insurance markets makes it structurally
impossible for the mandate to promote health redistribution, even in the case
of perfect compliance. Unless fragmentation is understood and addressed,
the best a mandate could do would be to serve paternalist objectives and to
capture some part of the efficiencies possible.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF MARKET FRAGMENTATION AND FAILED
HEALTH REDISTRIBUTION
Fragmentation of health insurance markets on the basis of risk is a welldocumented phenomenon of the American health insurance system.211 This
section does not reveal a novel story of fragmentation but rather augments the
stories that have been told in the literature to date in two ways. First, it
provides a summary retelling to reveal the full extent of both market-based
and regulatory fragmentation of the health insurance market. Second, it
analyzes how fragmentation will cause the individual mandate to fail to
achieve health redistribution (and to some extent limit its ability to fully
achieve paternalistic and efficiency objectives) because fragmentation limits
mechanisms for pooling risk and broadly distributing medical costs.
To the extent the mandate fails to achieve health redistribution, it will
clearly be unable to seize upon the benefits described above that may result
from it, including creating a more solidaristic model of health insurance.
Furthermore, a mandate without health redistribution will draw more people
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into a system where some (likely those who are poorer or less healthy) face a
disproportionately high cost to comply with the mandate.212
Below, I describe how insurance market competition has caused
fragmentation and how regulation has both exacerbated and entrenched
fragmentation.
Finally, I summarize the bottom-line impact of this
fragmentation on the mandate’s ability to promote health redistribution,
drawing evidence from reform in Massachusetts.213
A. Market-Driven Fragmentation and the Rise of Actuarial Risk
Rating
Fragmentation of the insurance markets grew first and foremost out of a
shift from a model of insurance built upon ideals of solidarity to one where
competition between commercial insurers is based upon actuarial risk rating
and risk selection.214 In the early twentieth century, Blue Cross (hospital) and
Blue Shield (medical) plans offered open enrollment and community rating,
where each group’s insurance premium is based upon average expected costs
in their broader community, enabling the risks and costs of poor health to be
shared among all members of the community.215 Blue Cross organizations
began to lose market share when commercial for-profit insurers offered
premiums based upon a group’s actual use of medical expenses.216 This
practice allowed groups with healthier-than-average employees to buy
insurance less expensively.217 The commercial insurers selected out (i.e.,
cherry-picked) low-risk groups and left the Blues with higher-risk groups. As
a result, the Blues’ average expected costs per subscriber increased, forcing
them to increase premiums and causing a business model based on
community rating to struggle.218
And thus began the ascendance of actuarial risk rating, where insurers
price premiums for an individual or group so that if risk-rating formulas
accurately predicted experienced costs (which is debated219), each enrollee or
group would finance its own medical expenses – a concept of insurance
antithetical to solidarity because each individual (or group) is presumed
212
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responsible for only his (or its) own expected risk. Professor Baker
characterizes it as a model with an “individualistic conception of self-interest .
. . as the foundation of health insurance.”220 In this model, insurers’ profit is
based on their ability to predict risk accurately and to avoid high-risk (i.e.,
“uninsurable”) beneficiaries.221 To maximize profit, an insurer seeks to avoid
the subscriber who will cost $50,000 and attract as many as possible who will
cost little to nothing.
This section describes the two major ways competition between
commercial insurers has driven fragmentation. First, insurers have divided
the market into three primary sub-markets – large group, small group, and
individual. With this structural fragmentation, risk does not pool among the
different markets. Second, in the individual (and less so the small group
market), insurers profit based upon their ability to actuarially rate and design
policies to individualize risk. This means that higher-risk individuals (or
groups) bear higher costs, and the highest-risk individuals (or groups) may be
excluded from coverage altogether and thus absorb out-of-pocket the full cost
of any health problems they might encounter, as explained below.
1. Structural Fragmentation into Three Sub-Markets
The method for risk selection differs among large groups, small groups,
and individual customers. Insurance carriers thus created three different
submarkets along these lines, and each insurer generally only operates within
one of these three sub-markets.222 As discussed above, selecting out the
healthy members is not important for large groups, where insurers are better
able to price premiums accurately in accordance with a group’s overall risk.
Within group insurance, each member generally pays the same premium for a
plan based upon average group member risk, as required by federal law, so
that the cost of medical care for the group is pooled and shared equally among
all members.223 Healthy members counterbalance the $50,000 beneficiary so
the insurer is less concerned that there are likely to be expensive members
within a group. Insurers can fairly accurately determine the expected costs for
the group and thus the premium to charge; they then adjust that premium
over time based upon the group’s actual expenses.
In contrast, in the individual market, where applicants seek insurance on
their own, premiums are based upon an individual’s (or family’s) own
expected risk. If an insurer presumes an individual to be high-risk, it will
subject him to high premiums, limited coverage (e.g., carve outs for preexisting conditions or low coverage limits), or may even deny him coverage, to
the extent allowed by a state’s laws on insurance issuance and pricing.224
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The small group market is a hybrid between the large group and
individual markets. All members in a small group are subject to the same
premium, which means that a small group pools risk among its members the
same way a large group does. However, insurers often treat a small group
more like an individual applicant, underwriting the risk of individual
members and designing or pricing policies in line with individual members’
risk. This is because in a small group, one or two very high-risk individuals
might make it difficult for an insurer to write insurance profitably.
Thus, at the most basic level of fragmentation, insurers created three submarkets in order to manage the different nature of risk in each. As noted
above, with the creation of these three sub-markets, risk is no longer pooled at
all across the large group, small group, and individual markets. This means
that people in the large group market do not share in the risk of poor health of
those in the individual market, causing a problem for health redistribution
that I will tease out in subsection 3 below.225
2. Fragmentation of the Individual Market on the Basis of Individual Risk
Fragmentation also occurs within each of these three markets in a way
that limits or defines who will share risk with whom, and to what degree,
within each sub-market. In particular, as described above, the nature of
actuarial risk rating in the individual (and less so the small group) market is
the epitome of fragmentation and is a frequent subject of study by economics,
public health, and health law scholars.226 A perfectly risk-rated system would
charge each individual the exact price of her own expected medical care, plus
administrative costs and profit. Thus, the more precisely actuarial formulas
attempt to predict and divide up medical expenditures, the less risk will pool
among individual enrollees. The entire structure of an actuarially-rated
individual market attempts to minimize health redistribution among
enrollees. This way, insurers can attract those who are perceived as low-risk
with the lowest premiums possible because they are only charged for their
own expected costs, which are by definition low.227
As noted above, insurers limit risk pooling (i.e., charge individuals
premiums based upon their own risk) through a number of risk selection and
pricing mechanisms to the extent allowed by state insurance regulation.228
For a high-risk applicant, an insurer might quote a premium higher than the
standard rate for a particular product, limit the scope of coverage by carving
out certain conditions or capping benefits, or deny coverage altogether. All of
these practices cause beneficiaries who are deemed higher-risk to pay higher
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prices and limit the extent that their risk is pooled with healthier applicants in
the individual market, who pay lower prices for the same or better coverage.229
This is not to say that there is no risk pooling of premiums in the
individual market. Some states force risk pooling through laws, such as
community rating laws, that require everyone within a community be charged
the same or similar premiums, rate bands that restrict the variance in
premium prices, pre-existing condition laws that prohibit insurers from
excluding certain conditions when issuing insurance, and guaranteed issue
laws that require insurers to take all comers.230 Even without such laws,
Economists Mark Pauly and Bradley Herring have identified some pooling
occurs across members within the individual market. Their research revealed
that while individual market premium prices increase with risk, they increase
less than proportionately. 231 They hypothesize this pooling occurs because of
insurers’ diminishing returns from actuarial rating and from assumption of
the ability to smooth premiums across an individual’s lifetime following
enactment of required guaranteed renewal of policies under HIPAA.232
Finally, even if premiums are charged based upon expected risk, actual
expenditures may deviate in a way that leads naturally to ex-post pooling of
realized medical costs. Yet, even with some pooling in the individual market,
scholars generally agree it is significantly less than in group markets.233
Any such limitations to risk pooling result in a situation where higher-risk
applicants in the individual market are more vulnerable to not being able to
access care when in need than similarly situated applicants in group markets.
As discussed above, the process of risk selection results in high overhead costs
that make the individual market coverage relatively more expensive, as
compared to group market coverage. The small group and individual markets
often have higher load factors and less generous policies.234 These overhead
costs and higher premiums for some result in more people priced out of the
individual market and other people, who obtain insurance, paying relatively
more for coverage.
In 2005, nearly 3 in 5 adults who applied for coverage in the individual
market failed to find a plan they could afford because they were denied
coverage, charged higher prices, or had a health problem excluded from
coverage.235 One study found that in states with little individual market
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regulation, as many as 30-40 percent of applicants are rejected for
coverage.236 Finally, while half of adults with employer-sponsored coverage
rate their coverage as excellent or good, only one-third of those with
individual market coverage do so.237 Thus, this fragmentation creates a
market where some people will pay more for the same or less access to
medical care than others, and those who are most in need of care might be
shut out of insurance markets.
B. Regulatory-Based Fragmentation and Inequities
At the same time, regulation has exacerbated fragmentation within both
public and private insurance. As explained in this section, regulatory
fragmentation has occurred intentionally through the creation of partial social
insurance and, perhaps less intentionally, with passage of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), and through tax subsidies
for group insurance.
1. Regulatory Exacerbation of Fragmentation
First, Medicare and Medicaid offered an incremental approach to social
health insurance, creating an initial divide between public and private
insurance as a compromise position following an unsuccessful effort to create
national health care in the mid-twentieth century.238 With the creation of
Medicare and Medicaid, Congress, in one fell swoop, lifted the most expensive
populations (the elderly and poor disabled) out of private insurance risk pools,
making a decision to fund their health insurance through tax revenues.
Elderly and disabled populations are now isolated into pools where the
average cost per beneficiary is high.
Although taking high-risk populations and providing them with care
regardless of ability to pay is desirable for many reasons, doing so has
nonetheless largely limited their ability to pool risk with lower-risk
individuals.239
This means that the health costs of the highest-risk
populations are not shared society-wide through health redistribution but
rather are funded by wealthier taxpayers or through payroll contributions.
Such an approach to providing access to medical care, regardless of ability to
pay, singles out high-risk groups for differential treatment, maintains a high
236
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average cost per person, and creates a system, particularly in Medicaid, where
high costs are borne more narrowly by wealthier taxpayers.
In the private insurance market, the McCarran-Ferguson Act resulted in
two main types of fragmentation. The first is geographical fragmentation.
McCarran-Ferguson protected state insurance regulation from unintended
intrusion of the federal government.240 With insurance regulation the realm
of the states, each state has developed its own health insurance rules and
market. Different carriers compete in each state, different rules apply to each
market in each state, and risk doesn’t effectively pool across state lines for the
most part.241
Second, fragmentation has also resulted from an interplay between the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and ERISA that motivated many large employers to
self-fund their health insurance plans and, in so doing, extract their
employees into their own risk pool. McCarran-Ferguson prompted an
increase in insurance regulation by states freed from concerns of
preemption.242 One form such state-level regulation has taken is mandated
benefit laws, which require all insurance plans to include particular (typically
expensive) medical conditions as a standard benefit.243 The intended result of
such a law is to spread the cost of treating that mandated condition among all
insured in a state – essentially risk pooling at the level of a particular
condition.244
However, such state insurance regulation also laid the groundwork for
fragmentation of the large group market into self-funded plans following the
passage of ERISA in 1974, which created uniform requirements for large,
multi-state companies in administering their employee benefit plans.245
Through a series of complex judicial interpretations expanding and
contracting the bounds of its preemption rule, which Professor Nan Hunter
calls the “ERISA accordion,” ERISA has been interpreted to allow large
employers to avoid state insurance regulation, including mandated benefit
laws, by creating self-funded employee benefit health plans.246 As discussed
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above, in a self-funded (i.e., self-insured) plan, the employer assumes risk for
its employees instead of buying a “fully-funded” plan from an insurer. In
return, the employer can design its plan, including choosing covered benefits,
so long as it’s in compliance with ERISA.247
Not surprisingly, following ERISA, there was an upsurge of self-funded
plans, so that 55 percent of all workers and 77 percent of workers in large
companies are now in self-funded plans,248 as compared to just 7 percent 1977,
and thereby segregated out of the broader insurance market.249 That is, in a
self-funded plan those employees pool their risk only with their co-workers,
not directly with any other private purchasers. Furthermore, employers who
have healthier-than-average employee populations have greater incentive to
self insure to avoid a situation in which their employees pool risk with and
subsidize costs for less healthy individuals outside of the company. Although
employers with self-funded plans carry reinsurance, which can be seen as a
mechanism that pools some self-funded plans’ losses, this coverage only pools
a slice of such losses above the attachment point for the policy.
With fewer healthy people in the large group insurance pools, the goals of
regulation, such as mandated benefits laws and health redistribution through
the individual mandate, which rely upon broad risk pooling, are impeded.
2. Regulatory Exacerbation of Inequities
While federal insurance regulation, through HIPAA and tax law,
augments risk pooling for group plans, it simultaneously exacerbates
inequities between individual and group markets by not equally facilitating
risk pooling in the individual market.
First, Congress passed HIPAA in part to enable people to maintain
meaningful coverage when moving between jobs (i.e., portability).250 While
HIPAA has largely achieved this goal for enrollees in group markets, because
of legislative compromise that limited its scope, it has largely failed to do so in
the individual market.251 Prior to HIPAA, many states had already begun to
implement portability requirements for group markets but not for the
individual market.252 Congress was persuaded to design the federal legislation
to mirror early state efforts to enable meshing of state and federal
standards.253
HIPAA imposes several requirements on health insurers that in essence
promote risk pooling within group markets. HIPAA requires that insurers
“guarantee issue” coverage to any applicant and “guarantee renewability” of
insured health insurance, “shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance company or any other
insurer . . . .” Id. § 1144(b)(2)(b).
247
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policies from year-to-year.254 It limits the scope and duration of pre-existing
condition exclusions to those conditions where “advice, diagnosis, care, or
treatment” was provided within six month before enrollment in a new plan. 255
It also prohibits discrimination in group plans on the basis of health status.256
These rules together require that insurers cover all members of a group for all
conditions, preventing limits to pooling that would otherwise result from
denying, dropping, or carving out coverage of conditions for higher-risk
applicants within a group.
While these requirements apply broadly to group insurance, in the
individual market, the guaranteed issue and pre-existing condition
requirements apply narrowly to “HIPAA eligible” subscribers, which in reality
has meant that most people who must rely on individual market coverage do
not benefit.257 Thus, HIPAA bolsters enrollee risk pooling in the group
markets by requiring insurers cover all members equitably while doing little
for those seeking insurance on their own, driving a wider wedge between the
quality of coverage available to group insured and most individually insured.
Last, but certainly not least, a critical force that exacerbates inequities among
group and individual markets is the federal tax subsidy for group policies.
Federal tax law excludes all dollars spent by employers on group health plans
from federal income and payroll taxes (including employer and employee
Social Security and Medicare taxes).258 Tax subsidies on group plans equal a
35-cent discount on every dollar spent on group health insurance.259 In
addition, employees’ own contributions toward premiums and cost shares
(copayments and deductibles) are excludable if paid out of “cafeteria plans.”260
This subsidy in effect pools part of the risk of members in group insurance
among all taxpayers, who fund this subsidy. It has been fodder for heated
health reform debate because of its size – more than $200 billion per year –
and its regressive nature.261 Note that this exclusion works regressively in two
ways. First, it applies to those with employer-sponsored insurance, who tend
to be higher earners.262 Second, higher earners are in higher tax brackets and
thus benefit more from excluded income.
In most cases, the only federal tax assistance for purchasing an individual
health insurance policy is the ability for those who itemize expenses to deduct
medical expenses that exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.263 This
254
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assistance is structured as a deduction, not an exclusion, so while it reduces
income tax liability, it does not reduce payroll (FICA) tax liability.264
Thus, through HIPAA and tax law, the federal government has
exacerbated inequities that run along lines of market fragmentation. These
inequities undermine an individual mandate’s ability to facilitate health
redistribution and access to care equally in both markets because higher-risk
enrollees in the individual market will find it relatively harder than similarly
situated individuals in group markets to obtain and finance coverage that
provides them with meaningful access to care.
C. Fragmentation’s Impediments to Health Redistribution with the
Individual Mandate
Mandating people join fragmented markets where they will differentially
bear risk based upon factors such as type of employer or past or anticipated
future health status is antithetical to the objective of health redistribution,
whereby costs of medical care are pooled more equitably among all healthy
and sick insureds.
For example, at the most basic, structural level, the lack of risk pooling
between private and public markets and among self-funded plans, large
group, small group, and individual markets poses a problem for equitable
health redistribution, unless each of the sub-markets contains a similar
distribution of healthy and sick insureds. Without pooling among markets,
the benefit from the financiers, who have costs lower than premiums, may
help enrollees in some markets more than others. If, under the mandate, one
market were to attract more financiers on average, that market would benefit
from lower average per enrollee costs and eventually lower premiums.265 For
example, imagine that following the mandate a large self-funded employer
enrolls 100 new, healthy members. Its employees will benefit from the ability
to pool risk with these new financiers, who will help to subsidize insurance
premiums for their sicker or less lucky coworkers.266 Their acquisition of
insurance will do nothing to help enrollees in other pools. Conversely, public
programs, for example, are likely to gain additional high-cost enrollees. The
cost of these enrollees will not be cushioned by any premium dollars paid by
newly-insured financiers.
While it is difficult to be certain how an individual mandate will affect
distribution of the healthy and sick among each sub-market nationally, it is
discussion of HSAs and solidarity, see Amy Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership
Society Health Care Policy, 80 Tulane L. Rev. 777 (2006).
264
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Family Found., Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: An Issue Brief 10-11 (2008).
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Robinson, Consolidation and the Transformation of Competition in Health Insurance, 23
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reasonable to believe the mandate might cause more healthy to enroll in the
large group market and self-funded plans and sick to enroll individually. On
one hand, consider the almost certainly healthier-than-average population
whom a mandate would compel to enroll in group coverage. This population
is comprised of two types of opt-outs. Some previously declined available
group coverage. Anyone who had access to subsidized group coverage and
who is less healthy than average would have had a strong incentive to enroll
since their premiums, based upon the average risk of the group, would be
lower than their own expected risk. Thus, those who opted-out are likely to be
healthier than average. In addition, others may gain access to group coverage
that is newly sponsored and offered by an employer post-mandate if an
employer mandate is simultaneously enacted. Any employer who decides to
offer new group coverage, rather than opting to meet any contribution
requirements by subsidizing employees’ purchase in the individual market,
presumably has an employee group with above-average health. The employer
can get more value for its healthy employees by creating their own group plan,
where they can benefit from low average costs per person. Thus, the group
market will likely benefit from an influx of new, healthier-than-average
enrollees.
On the other hand, the mandate could simultaneously result in a residual
population with individual coverage that is less healthy than average. Some
part of the population that will join the individual market under a mandate
has previously been declined coverage or priced out of coverage offered at
higher than standard premiums. This population is probably less healthy
than average and will likely buy into the individual market to comply with a
mandate. Thus, as the group market benefits from new financiers, the
individual market will not feel their benefit and may simultaneously suffer
from an influx of high-risk enrollees.
Not surprisingly, early results in Massachusetts demonstrate that the
mandate has caused uneven distribution of healthy and sick among different
markets.267 Massachusetts has seen some adverse selection into governmentsubsidized plans, and an infusion of healthy into already strong employer
markets.268 Nearly 60 percent of the newly insured are now enrolled in
government-subsidized insurance through MassHealth, Massachusetts’
Medicaid program, (76,000 new enrollees) or through Commonwealth Care
(“CommCare”), a new program offering sliding scale subsidies to residents
who earn below 300 percent of FPL and who do not have access to employersponsored insurance (169,000 new enrollees).269 Contrary to concerns that
the reform might “crowd out” employer-sponsored insurance, Massachusetts
has seen the opposite, possibly due to employer mandates, as discussed
below.270 One hundred and thirty-eight thousand people (35 percent of the
newly insured) enrolled in private group insurance.271
267
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An Urban Institute study shows that healthier insureds in Massachusetts
are disproportionately enrolled in employer-sponsored plans.272
Of
Massachusetts non-elderly adults who self-identify as in “good, very good, or
excellent health,” 84 percent have employer-sponsored insurance. 273 Those
who self-identify as in “fair or poor health” are enrolled disproportionately in
public or individual coverage (53 percent), rather than in employer-sponsored
insurance (47 percent).274 Regardless of whether the mandate created this
reality or if it was already present before reform, if these polls accurately
reflect health status, they show that the mandate can only go so far to enable
risk pooling among the healthy and sick to the extent they belong to different
risk pools.
Even if we put the above discussion aside and assume that healthy
financiers will buy coverage at the same proportion in each market, the health
redistributive benefits of their doing so will be limited in the individual
market. To the extent insurers can still engage in risk selection and
differential pricing, when healthier people buy insurance in the individual
market, they will pay lower premiums more in line with their own low
expected risk, providing few premium dollars to subsidize medical care of
others. The converse is that sicker individuals will pay higher premiums (or
get less valuable coverage) because of their high individual risk. Furthermore,
when the voluntary opt-outs buy into the individual market, as much as 30-40
percent of their premium dollars go toward overhead, leaving less of a surplus
to fund care for the sick.275 This means that those whom the mandate compels
to buy insurance in the individual market are less engaged in a system of
health redistribution – either as financiers or receivers of subsidy – than those
who belong to a group health plan, where everyone pays the same premium
for the same plan.
With such barriers to health redistribution, it is not surprising that an
individual mandate will fall short of creating a system that enables
distribution of medical care equitably on the basis of medical need and that
submarkets with greater fragmentation will be farthest from achieving this
goal. Fragmentation has led to a system where some are charged more for less
coverage – if able to obtain coverage at all – simply because they buy
insurance in the individual and small group markets, in particular if they
show any likelihood to need care. Those insured through their employer pay
less to access medical care and benefit from beneficial tax treatment and
employer contributions to premiums.276 Those insured in the individual
insurance market are likely to receive less access to care while paying
relatively more. Forty-three percent of adults in individual plans spend over
272
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10 percent of income on health expenses as compared to twenty-four percent
of those in employer plans.277 Scholars believe that the individual market has
primarily served as a safety net between periods of employment-based
insurance.278 Those whom a mandate compels into this market may be forced
to convert this safety net into more permanent, expensive coverage.
Fragmentation not only leads to highly variable premium costs, it also
tends to disadvantage those with lower incomes or who are already sick and
more likely to be consumers in the more fragmented individual market.
Enrollees in employer-sponsored group insurance are higher earners on
average. Eight of ten higher-wage workers have insurance through their
employer, as compared to three in ten poor workers.279 And those earning
under $40,000 a year are more likely to have insurance in the individual
market.280 In addition, those who are already sick and without employer
coverage are likely to suffer most from actuarial rating in the individual
market and may be unable to access insurance in absence of guaranteed issue
laws.
A mandate that bolsters the group markets with new low-risk enrollees
and demands more from the sick and the poor in the individual market to
comply is counterproductive to the goals of health redistribution. The
mandate would, in essence, compel everyone into insurance markets in the
name of making medical care more accessible to those in need, but because of
fragmentation, it would not only fail to achieve this goal but also
disproportionately burden more vulnerable populations.
V. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IN LIGHT OF FRAGMENTATION
The solution to the impediments fragmentation presents for the mandate
is, not surprisingly, defragmentation. Eliminating fragmentation can reshape
insurance institutions in a way that accommodates risk pooling and enables
greater health redistribution, rather than letting the institution, as is, limit the
way Americans share and distribute risk post-mandate.
Because of the incentives commercial insurers have to fragment, there are
three primary ways to eliminate insurance market fragmentation: change
insurers’ incentives so they profit on a basis other than fragmentation;
regulate insurers to prohibit fragmentation; or restructure insurance markets
in a way that eliminates fragmentation, including by expanding the bounds of
public insurance to replace private insurance for some beneficiaries.
To be clear, it is certainly possible to eliminate fragmentation in one fell
swoop by instituting a single payer system like that in Canada or the UK.
However because this approach is considered politically infeasible in the
current American political climate, I focus instead on solutions that are more
compatible with the preservation of private insurance, and, in particular,
included in or consistent with the approach taken in the Health Reform Law.
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European countries like Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands show the
potential to create less fragmented health insurance systems with multiple,
private payers, so long as insurers are highly regulated and programs are
carefully designed.281 By saying the solutions discussed below may be more
feasible than a single payer system is not to suggest they would go
uncontested; the contentiousness of reform debates over the past year
illustrate that many of these ideas will generate significant controversy in
their own right, especially in the charged political climate that appears to have
taken hold of Congress.
This article does not intend to describe comprehensively every policy
solution that could address fragmentation, but rather offers a framework for
thinking about how a range of policies might work to ameliorate
fragmentation. It highlights three categories of solutions that could increase
the scope and breadth of risk pooling among more heterogeneous populations
– both healthy and sick – without dismantling private insurance. The
solutions are discussed in the order from those that are less politically charged
to those that are more contested, in large part because of increasing
disruptiveness to the private markets. Part A describes the use of incentives to
discourage private insurers from engaging in risk selection and thus causing
fragmentation, particularly in the individual market. Part B outlines
regulatory solutions that prohibit or reverse fragmentation of markets, such as
requiring insurers to issue policies to all applicants and charge insureds
premiums that fall within a certain range of price variation. The Health
Reform Law relies on versions of policies from both of these categories of
solutions. Finally, Part C examines ways we might restructure insurance
markets more fundamentally going forward, such as through merging private
markets, creation and careful design of exchanges, or expanding public
insurance in ways that might cover those most harmed by fragmentation. At
the end of this section, I suggest that undertaking such policies of
defragmentation might in fact help shape the legitimacy of health
redistribution over time. In other words, I probe whether blurring the lines of
fragmentation that currently define American limits to risk pooling might
help reshape American norms regarding, and perhaps preferences for,
broader distribution of the costs of poor health.
A. Reducing Insurers’ Incentives to Fragment Markets
Some policy solutions improve the individual market by reducing
incentives for risk selection, either through attempts to make insurers less
sensitive to enrolling high-risk applicants or through ex-post solutions that
lessen insurers’ exposure if they do enroll a high-cost member.282 The theory
of such approaches is that they can cause commercial insurers to be less
concerned about the need to select out good risks and, if effective in doing so,
can eliminate some expenses associated with such risk selection practices.
281
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For a comprehensive discussion of approaches to limiting risk selection and risk
adjustment, see Katherine Baicker & William H. Dow, Risk Selection and Risk Adjustment:
Improving Insurance in the Individual and Small Group Markets, 46 Inquiry 215 (2009).

62

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

VOL. 36 NO. 1 2010

The Health Reform Law incorporates some of these solutions, mostly in ways
that will lubricate insurance markets in the short term before more
comprehensive insurance market regulation becomes effective.283
One way to reduce risk selection is to lessen the profit possible from
attracting a healthier mix of enrollees through a practice known as risk
adjustment of premiums. The idea is to create a system where insurers are
compensated more for higher-risk enrollees and less for lower-risk ones so
that they do not benefit, in theory, from cherry-picking out healthier
enrollees. While the enrollees still contribute equally (or on the basis of
income or wealth) through premiums or taxes, a central administrative body
pools the contributions and then pays insurers based upon the risk profile of
their enrollees. Such risk adjustment is used, for example, in Medicare
Advantage plans, in some states’ Medicaid managed care plans (including in
Massachusetts), and in many European countries, including in the
Netherlands, whose social insurance system uses fairly sophisticated riskadjustment formulas.284 Risk adjustment of premiums is included in the
Health Reform Law for plans that will be sold through state insurance
exchanges created under the Law.285 However, such efforts at risk adjustment
can be incomplete if they are not based upon comprehensive information and
are difficult to administer, particularly if they are comprehensive.286
Another way states have attempted to limit insurers’ exposure in the
individual market is through the use of high-risk pools, where the states offer
plans, typically subsidized, for high-risk enrollees to draw them out of the
standard private insurance market.287 In theory, if the highest-risk people
were isolated within high-risk pools, insurers might worry less about enrolling
outliers. In practice, these pools may not achieve the desired effect. Although
a majority of states have high-risk pools, these pools have only enrolled about
200,000 people nationally and are chronically underfunded.288
Low
enrollment has been attributed to long waiting periods for pre-existing
conditions, limited benefits, and expensive coverage.289
Further, despite the potential high-risk pools may offer to increase
efficiency and coverage in the individual market, they might do so at a tradeoff to health redistribution. Even if effective, such solutions remove the cost
of the sickest enrollees from insurance pools, lessening the ability of the
healthy to share in the risk of and to finance care for the sickest in their
communities within insurance risk pools. Taxes (either on insurers or the
public at large) must be used to subsidize high-risk pool coverage, which
states have found can be difficult pragmatically and politically.290
283
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Finally, there are also ex-post solutions that could limit insurers’ exposure
even if they enroll high-risk insured. Professor Katherine Swartz has
championed an expansion of public reinsurance as an alternative way to
reduce risk selection by limiting the exposure insurers face from exorbitantly
high costs if they write coverage for a particularly expensive beneficiary.291
She proposes the government provide excess-of-loss relief, assuming some
percentage of losses above a certain dollar threshold for a policy.292 This type
of government reinsurance is incorporated in several ways in the Health
Reform Law, including as a means to cushion the costs of 55-65-year-olds in
group plans to incent employers to continue to insure retirees in their group
plans.293
Although public reinsurance may reduce the behaviors insurers engage in
to avoid expensive beneficiaries, it also raises concerns. Professor Timothy
Stolzfus Jost argues that such an approach of “backstopping private insurers”
is not the most efficient way to invest tax dollars in insurance because it
decreases insurers’ incentives to control health care utilization and cost if such
costs can be externalized onto the government.294 Swartz believes it is possible
to preserve incentives for cost control, by requiring insurers retain some
percentage of the risks above the attachment point for the policy.295 However,
the two goals of reducing insurers’ incentives to risk select by limiting
exposure and maintaining their incentives to control utilization are in tension
with one another. The greater insurers’ exposure, the more they will both
want to avoid high-risk individuals and also manage expenditures.
Conversely, the lower their exposure, the more they will welcome high-risk
individuals and also have less incentive to manage costs.
Furthermore, such programs may trigger a Russian doll problem, where
removing a layer of outliers may not eliminate insurers’ desire to differentiate
among remaining beneficiaries. Once the first Russian doll is removed,
another lies beneath – slightly smaller but remarkably similar. Likewise, even
if the costs of the top two percent of most expensive beneficiaries are covered
by government-funded reinsurance, insurers might then be concerned with
those in the 95-98 percentiles of spending and continue underwriting and
marketing to manage these new “highest” risks. Finally, once the government
guarantees insurers protection from high risks, it is questionable what value
insurers add beyond simple administration of policies.
B.

Regulatory Defragmentation
Massachusetts

of

Markets:

Lessons

from

Insurance market regulation has been used to require insurers to reduce
fragmentation within the individual market. While such regulation is a
critical element of defragmentation and is an important and significant focus
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of the Health Reform Law, it might nonetheless prove to be a partial solution
and a difficult to design and imprecise tool, as evidenced by challenges in
Massachusetts, highlighted below.296
1. Insurance Market Regulation and the Connector
One might consider regulation of private insurers as a counterbalance to
the benefit insurers enjoy from the individual mandate. With an individual
mandate, the government creates a requirement that all Americans obtain
insurance. Yet it leaves implementation for the most part in the hands of
private insurers, who, to whatever degree permitted, design, price, and issue
the plans that Americans must buy. This power over design, in essence,
imbues insurers with a tremendous amount of delegated state power to
determine the contours of how the mandate is put in place and effects
Americans.297 Regulations, thus, may be seen as a way to ensure insurers
implement the mandate consistent with intended legislative objectives,
including health redistribution.
Private markets can be regulated to prohibit the risk selection practices
that fragmented markets in the first place. Such regulation, which has been a
part of all federal proposals for reform and is central to the Health Reform
Law,298 is like navigating a u-turn back toward a Blue Cross, community-rated
model of health insurance by limiting insurers’ freedom to differentiate
among applicants based upon risk rating.
At a minimum, regulation could limit the risk selection practices that
drive fragmentation in the individual market. It could do so by requiring that
insurers in the individual market issue policies to all applicants (guaranteed
issue), that plans meet minimum benefits standards so that insurers don’t use
policy design to segment customers by risk, that pre-existing condition
exclusions are limited, and that applicants pay community-rated premiums.
All of these types of requirements are included in the Health Reform Law,299
and many of these changes have been implemented in Massachusetts, whose
reform effort evinces the ability of regulation to lessen, although not eliminate
fragmentation.
Massachusetts implemented several coordinated policies, some regulatory
and some structural, to increase health redistribution within the individual
296
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market and between individual and small group markets and to ameliorate
inequities in the individual market arising from high overhead and
inequitable application of tax subsidies. Even prior to reform, Massachusetts
was one of the few states both to require that insurers guarantee issue of
insurance to all applicants and charge modified community rates in its
individual market.300 Massachusetts’s modified community rating requires
that the most expensive premium for a plan can be no more than two times
the least expensive premium for the same plan.301 Further, premiums may
only vary based upon a limited number of factors, including age, geography,
and group size.302 Such modified community rating promotes greater,
although not completely equitable, distribution of medical costs among
insureds in the individual market.303 The reform further limits differentiation
through plan design by requiring all plans offered meet certain actuarial
values.304
Massachusetts also addressed inconsistencies in tax law between group
and individual market insurance by enabling purchase of individual market
plans with pre-tax dollars for more people.305 Massachusetts created the
Connector, an independent, quasi-governmental agency, which acts as a
clearinghouse for the purchase of health insurance by small businesses and
individuals without access to employer-sponsored coverage.306 The legislation
increased individual purchasers’ access to insurance on a pre-tax basis, by
requiring that employers with over ten employees sponsor a premium-only
cafeteria plan, which its employees can use to fund purchase of individual
insurance with pre-tax dollars through the Connector.307 The benefit of this
requirement does not extend to those who work for companies with fewer
than 10 employees, those whose employers don’t comply, or the
unemployed.308
2. Limitations of Regulatory Solutions
While Massachusetts’s reform shows that a more heavily regulated
insurance industry can provide a stronger foundation for an individual
mandate to promote health redistribution, particularly in the individual
market, it also suggests the limits of a regulatory solution.
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Massachusetts’s insurance market regulation – while more aggressive
than most states’ insurance regulations at eliminating risk selection – did not
close the door on such practices, and certain populations still bear more of the
cost of reform. Two percent of the population was exempted from the
mandate on “affordability” grounds because the costs of available coverage
equaled more than ~7.5-10.5% of their take-home income.309 One population
particularly vulnerable to exemption is middle-income 55-65 year olds, who
don’t quality for subsidies and could be subject to relatively high premiums
under the modified community rating rules, which allow older insureds to be
charged twice as much as younger insureds for a policy.310 One study reported
that in December, 2008 the least expensive plan for a middle-income 56-yearold could cost as much as $9,872 in total annual costs, including premium,
deductible and co-insurance costs.311 By exempting this population from the
mandate, the Commonwealth yielded to the reality that reform didn’t
distribute costs in a way that made insurance affordable for its aging, yet not
yet Medicare eligible, residents. This type of problem for older uninsured
might be even worse under the Health Reform Law, which allows older
insured to be charged 3 times as much as younger insured.312
In an attempt to make insurance affordable as broadly as possible, the
Connector Board authorized deeper subsidies to more individual market
enrollees than initially projected.313 Doing so increased the overall cost of
reform in early years and has threatened its stability in light of budgetary
pressure more recently.314 In response to recent budget cuts, Massachusetts
limited the scope of subsidized coverage available to 31,000 legal immigrants
by eliminating dental, hospice, and skilled nursing care and by limiting choice
of insurer to one managed care company.315 Finally, it has also eliminated
automatic enrollment into subsidized plans to control costs through natural
attrition and failure of some residents to enroll.316
In addition, Massachusetts’s individual market still enables insurers to
engage in risk selection through product design that steers enrollees to selfsegregate into different products in part of the basis of their own anticipated
future health.317 Experts are concerned that in this system, low-income
individual market purchasers of insurance may buy plans with low premiums
in return for high cost-sharing obligations, which might deter use of medical

309

Robert Steinbrook, M.D., Health Care Reform in Massachusetts – Expanding
Coverage, Escalating Costs, 358 N. Eng. J. Med. 2757, 2759 (2008).
310
See Rachel Nardin et al., Massachusetts’ Plan: A Failed Model for Health
Care Reform 8 (2009), http://www.pnhp.org/mass_report/mass_report_Final.pdf.
311
Id.
312
H.R. 3590, supra note 2.
313
See Holohan & Blumberg, supra note 207, at 4.
314
See id. Original estimated costs for subsidies for CommCare’s subsidies were $400M
for FY08; actual costs are estimated to be $647M. Id. at 3. For FY09, original estimates were
$725M; the amount requested for budget was $869M and actual costs may be even greater.
Id.
315
Abby Goodnough, Massachusetts Cuts Back Immigrants’ Health Care, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 1, 2009, at A17.
316
MA Health Care Hit by Budget Cuts, Mass. Ass'n Healthcare Access Mgmt., June
25, 2009, http://www.mahamweb.org/june_2009_news.html.
317
See Jost, supra note 4 (discussing coverage stratification in Massachusetts).

OIL AND WATER

67

care or threaten income security if medical care is needed.318 For example,
plans that meet Massachusetts’s “minimum creditable coverage” requirements
could have deductibles as high as $2000 for an individual or $4000 for a
family and out-of-pocket maximums as high as $5000 for individuals and
$10,000 for families.319 These levels of out-of-pocket spending, similar to
those allowed in the Health Reform Law,320 could serve as a significant
deterrent of use of care for many of the families and undercut the mandate’s
effectiveness toward its goals.
These limitations of regulatory solutions to address problems of
fragmentation are perhaps not surprising.321 Because insurers’ profit depends
on risk selection and segmentation, they have developed numerous practices
to achieve such ends.322 Historically, insurers have been innovative in finding
alternative factors to use for risk selection – both legal and illegal – when
some practices are prohibited.323 For example, insurers can design provider
networks to attract healthy or sick applicants.324 Insurers have also been
known to disenroll high-risk insureds (“lemon dropping”) through rigorous
utilization review, poor service, or even discontinuing a particular policy.325 It
would be nearly impossible to regulate private markets in all the ways
necessary to prevent insurers from treating people with different risks
differentially, as well as to enforce all such regulations.326 Thus, while private
insurance regulation is a critical element of defragmentation, and one wellrepresented in the Health Reform Law, it may be insufficient to maximize the
mandate’s ability to promote health redistribution.
C. Restructuring Markets
While regulatory solutions offer the potential to address some problems of
defragmentation, particularly within the individual market, solutions that
dismantle structural barriers to risk pooling – among private markets, among
public programs, and between public and private markets – could begin to
melt the boundaries of fragmentation more comprehensively. There are
numerous ways to restructure markets towards the goal of reducing
fragmentation. This paper does not attempt to examine them all. Rather, this
section intends to select out and describe several policies that might result in
significant structural defragmentation to explore the potential benefit of a
structural approach. While the Health Reform Act ventures to a small extent
318
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into this space with Medicaid expansions and the creation of state-based
exchanges for the sale of insurance, these types of solutions are largely beyond
the scope of the current reform. These structural solutions could, however,
provide a roadmap for future policies aimed at the next layer of
defragmentation.
1. Restructuring Private Markets
The current boundaries to risk pooling in private markets could be
softened or broken down in a number of ways over time. For example,
individual and small group markets can be combined to provide better risk
pooling opportunities for the individual market. Massachusetts’ merger of its
individual and small group markets in 2006 was credited with lowering
premium prices for individual market policies about 15 percent, which was
counterbalanced by a 1-1.5 percent increase in premiums for small group
plans.327 The Health Reform Law similarly allows states to merge their
individual and small group markets, beginning in 2014.328
In conjunction, a health insurance exchange, depending on how designed,
could both administratively and symbolically blur lines currently drawn by
insurers between markets. At the most basic level, exchanges can serve as a
marketplace to make the purchase of insurance more transparent within the
bounds of current plans and markets. Yet, an exchange might serve a larger
risk pooling and defragmentation role if explicitly and carefully designed to do
so. An exchange could be designed to enable risk to distribute among all
exchange enrollees, who might include individuals previously divided among
individual and group and public and private plans. In addition, the exchange
could act as a purchasing pool, where an administrator negotiates lower
reimbursement rates with providers on the behalf of all enrollees in exchange
plans (even if these plans are administered by different private insurers).329
Thus, as more people enroll through an exchange, all members might benefit
from the increase in scale and bargaining power. Finally, an exchange could
also create a symbolic shared identity among all enrollees, who might credit
the exchange, rather than individual private insurance companies
administering the policies, with insuring their health.
Massachusetts’s Connector hosts such a website exchange where
consumers can compare and enroll in plans, and a similar model of statebased exchanges is included in the federal Health Reform Law.330 While the
327
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Connector has created a more transparent marketplace for individual market
and small group policies where customers can compare plans side-by-side on
relevant criteria, many believe it has not seized upon its full potential to
reduce fragmentation.331 Some argue it has not leveraged its market power to
negotiate better rates for enrollees; rather, it relies on individual insurers to
each do so separately.332
This is an issue of particular concern in
Massachusetts because of the pressure large academic medical centers have
put on insurers to keep reimbursement rates high, contributing to higher than
average medical costs in the state.333 Furthermore, the Connector has done
little to streamline administration or marketing of the different categories of
plans sold through it. The subsidized CommCare and nonsubsidized
CommChoice plans are marketed, sold, designed, administered, and priced
differently. And MassHealth, while similar in many ways to the subsidized
CommCare plans, remains a separate program. Thus, while exchanges have
potential to serve goals of defragmentation, they must be intended, and
carefully designed and implemented, in a way that seizes upon this potential.
Finally, to break down the barrier between the small group, individual,
and large group market, a final and bold step would be to begin to dismantle
the current system of employer-sponsored insurance (“ESI”). Erosion of ESI
is typically framed as a concern or potential negative consequence of
reform.334 In the short term, such concerns may be valid to the extent erosion
would undercut what is currently the market that best pools risk and offers
the least expensive, highest value policies.
Such fear of crowding out ESI leads to reform elements, such as employer
mandates and the above mentioned reinsurance of policies for 55-65-yearolds in employer plans, that aim to stabilize ESI. In Massachusetts’s reform,
the employer mandate has been largely credited with preventing crowd-out.335
Massachusetts’s employer mandate is structured as a “pay or play” law,
requiring employers with more than ten employees to contribute to their
employees’ health coverage or, alternately, to pay a fine of $295 annually per
eligible employee.336 This type of law attempts to avoid triggering ERISA
preemption of state regulation of employee benefits by creating incentives for,
rather than directly requiring, employer contribution to their employees’
health insurance.337 This distinction may be a legal splitting of hairs. In
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2009/May/I
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reality, most rational employers would choose to comply by establishing,
maintaining, and contributing to an ESI plan, rather than paying the fine. By
contributing to ESI, their dollars go further because every dollar is tax
subsidized and results in a direct benefit for employees. Employers can thus
offer employees more value from every dollar spent, which will presumably
translate into benefits in terms of recruiting and retention. While employers
could theoretically choose to spend the same dollars paying a fine, most
rational businesses would put the dollars toward additional employee
compensation in the form of an ESI plan.
While such preservation of ESI through a mandate might be beneficial in
the short-run, in term of maximizing health redistribution, such preservation
may be a short-term gain and long-term loss. Erosion of ESI might in fact be
beneficial to defragmentation and could in fact be hastened through
elimination of the tax subsidies for these plans (although such an approach
would be a significant political feat). If dollars employers spent on health
insurance were no longer less expensive than dollars spent on salary, offering
health insurance – which requires significant administrative investment for
American firms – might no longer be an appealing way for them to
compensate their employees. We might thus see the prevalence of ESI drop
off significantly.
In the long-term, such erosion of ESI, including both self-funded and
fully-funded plans, could eliminate current barriers between individual and
group insurance. We could imagine that erosion of plans in the group
insurance market might result in a system where all Americans would be
insured in the individual market.338 If everyone were in the individual market,
enacted but did not implement such mandates (Massachusetts returned to and eventually
enacted one in 2006, as discussed above). Shelley K. Hubner, State “Pay or Play” Employer
Mandates: Prescribed or Preempted?, 20 The Health L. 15, 17-18 (2008); Peter D. Jacobson &
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KAN. L. REV. 1173, 1175-97 (2007) (describing failed employer mandates).
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Supreme Court this session. See generally Borzi, supra note 249 (discussing ERISA
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and the individual market were regulated in a way that reduced internal
fragmentation, fairly broad health redistribution would be possible among all
privately insureds. Such a system might begin to look structurally more like
the Dutch or Swiss systems, which experience significant health redistribution
within a system reliant on private insurers.
2. Expansion of Existing Public Insurance and the Public Option
Finally, an alternate route might entail expansion of existing public
programs or creation of a public plan option to draw a greater proportion of
Americans, particularly those currently left to the individual market, into
public health insurance plans. Such plans, organized around larger social
goals, could better promote risk pooling and provide higher-value coverage
more equitably.
These approaches have received the most resistance when proposed as
part of reform, in large part because they more aggressively disrupt the
current private market and public programs. Some are particularly concerned
that expansion of public insurance is simply a slippery slope toward a single
payer system.339 While it would arguably take more than a slippery slope to
move from our current fragmented public and private insurance markets all
the way to a single payer system, these types of proposals could significantly
increase the number of publically insured Americans. If eligibility for public
programs is broadened and these programs offer high-quality, high-value
insurance, it is in fact likely that more people will enroll in them, even if they
must buy in at “full price.” If, for example, more people were allowed to buy
into Medicare, and if Medicare were a more appealing option than private
insurance, we would expect to see crowd out of private insurance by Medicare.
Currently, public insurance programs – federal and state – finance 46 percent
of all health care delivered in the United States.340 If a new public plan were
added and/or current public programs were expanded, well over half of the
health costs of our population might be publically financed. That being said,
the patchwork of publicly financed insurance would still be far from a single
payer system.
There are a number of ways policymakers and scholars have considered
expanding enrollment in public insurance plans. The one approach that made
its way into the federal Health Reform Law is Medicaid expansion, by
extending eligibility to 133 percent of the FPL and removing categorical
eligibility restrictions, which currently limit Medicaid eligibility to pregnant
women, children up to age 19, their parents and caretakers, the disabled, and
the elderly.341 This approach will not only grow the numbers of beneficiaries
in Medicaid but will also diversify risk pools by allowing more low-income
healthy beneficiaries into the program. Doing so would promote greater
health redistribution among a somewhat more diverse group of insureds and
bring down the cost of the program per insured.
339
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Over time, we could even imagine consolidating programs like Medicaid
and SCHIP as the eligibility criterion began to overlap. The earlier House Bill
had envisioned such a phasing out of SCHIP over time, where SCHIP
beneficiaries would have been transitioned either into Medicaid or a new
public plan option.342 Such streamlining could lead to administrative
simplification, better risk pooling, and perhaps greater public acceptance of
the programs. Enrollment, reimbursement rate negotiation with providers,
and billing could be consolidated. Such streamlining would also prevent
variable access to care for someone having to switch programs and perhaps
providers as earnings increase, as is now the case for some states that have
different Medicaid and SCHIP provider networks.
Consolidation of such programs to encompass a broader range of incomes
might also positively shift the public perception of these programs as they
cover not just the stigmatized poor.343 Consider the food stamp program. As
recipients of the food stamp program have begun to include not just the poor
but also the middle class (and in fact currently 1/8 of Americans), the
perceived value of the program and public support for it have grown.344
Another approach would be to expand Medicare eligibility to younger
beneficiaries, who might pay a premium to join early.345 The idea of allowing
55-65-year-olds to buy in was briefly on the table as part of discussions in the
Senate towards the end of 2009.346 Since this age group is particularly
disadvantaged in the individual market, a Medicare buy-in option, even if
expensive, might be an attractive option for them. A buy-in would bring
paying, younger, and presumably healthier-on-average beneficiaries into the
Medicare program, increasing the program’s ability to promote greater health
redistribution. It would also allow the newly enrolled to maintain their same
coverage as they aged into subsidized Medicare coverage.
Finally, the public insurance expansion proposal that garnered the most
attention (and opposition) in reform debates was the creation of a new
national public plan option to compete with private insurance plans.347 If well
implemented, a public insurance option could be a platform for greater health
342
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redistribution across a diverse population and across state lines if it were able
to attract a large number of both high and low risk beneficiaries to join. The
ability of a public plan to attract both healthy and sick enrollees would rely, in
particular on at least two factors. The first is that regulatory requirements
imposed on private plans must sufficiently prevent them from selecting out
the healthiest beneficiaries and leaving the highest risk beneficiaries to the
public plan. Professor Jacob Hacker, a champion of the public plan option,
contends that successful implementation of a public plan relies upon applying
the same rules to public and private plans (e.g., guaranteed issue, community
rating, minimum benefits rules) and risk adjustment of premiums to deter
commercial insurers from cherry-picking healthy beneficiaries.348
The second is whether the public plan will be able to sufficiently control
costs so that even if it were to enroll higher risk insureds on average, it could
still offer insurance inexpensively enough to attract healthy enrollees.
Because a public plan will inevitably attract many higher-risk enrollees who
have had difficulty obtaining quality private insurance, it must be able to
counterbalance the higher per person medical costs of such enrollees to
remain a compelling alternative to private insurance. There is reason to
believe a public plan could do so by operating with lower administrative
costs,349 by managing cost growth, and because it does not extract profits for
shareholders.350 Studies also suggest a public plan may also be more
successful at controlling costs through negotiating lower reimbursement rates
for medical care than private insurers have been, as has occurred with
Medicare and Medicaid, so long as it is able to insure enough enrollees to
accrue sufficient bargaining power.351 Finally, a large public plan might
provide an opportunity for experimentation with improved methods for
health care utilization and costs.352 Despite the perceptions to the contrary,
Medicare may be more effective than private insurers at restraining excessive
cost growth.353
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Even with these potential means to manage costs, it is possible the public
plan may not be able to counterbalance the number of higher-than-averagerisk enrollees it attracts and would itself create greater fragmentation. If the
public plan enrolls the highest-risk Americans, it would enable private pools
to grow healthier on average. The public plan could in essence default into a
high-risk pool and exacerbate fragmentation by further limiting risk pooling
among healthy and sick, with the healthier Americans in private insurance
and sicker Americans in public insurance.
Although the possibility exists that a public option defaults into a highrisk pool, the fact that proposals for a public option ignited strong insurance
industry resistance and were eventually defeated suggests its likely ability to
compete for both sick and healthy enrollees. To the extent the public plan
attracts a large number of both healthy and sick beneficiaries, and especially
to the extent it is permitted to draw new enrollees from all of the existing submarkets (individual, small group and large group), it could facilitate
considerably broad health redistribution. It could also provide more equitable
access to insurance for enrollees who would have otherwise struggled to find
the same in the individual market.
Finally, it’s possible a national, coherently defined public plan could
generate a sense of group salience among a heterogeneous mix of insured.354
Once people belong to a shared public plan, they may develop identification
with being a member of the plan. Even if they don’t extract in benefits as
much as they contribute each year in premiums, enrollees might appreciate
having a safety net of high quality coverage that wasn’t previously available
through the private market. If such a sense of group salience and loyalty to
the public plan were to develop, it might increase the likelihood of the
political sustainability of the plan.355
D. Defragmentation and Building Solidarity
What is the power of lessening the lines of fragmentation while
mandating all Americans carry insurance? Is it simply about short-term
health redistribution and who shoulders more of the weight of universal
health care reform? Or, as scholars have suggested, is there more at stake? Is
it possible that where lines are drawn actually constructs notions of who is
willing to share risk with whom? Might broadly redefining the institutional
structure of who will share risk with whom help to shape American’s
conceptions about who should share risk with whom? While answering these
questions is beyond the scope of this paper, asking them highlights what
might be at stake with continued efforts at defragmentation as the Health
Reform Law is implemented over the next decade.
We have seen acculturation over time in our current health insurance
system. The individualization of risk in the private insurance market – a fairly
recent phenomenon that developed through the rise of actuarial rating in the
mid-twentieth century – has created a deeply embedded notion that private
health insurance is all about individual risk. Part of American insurance
culture is “fair” pricing, which has been redefined as actuarially fair pricing.
354
355

Lester, supra note 150, at 46.
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The different approaches discussed above to addressing fragmentation
will each result in a different degree and type of defragmentation, and
different pictures of risk pooling. The regulatory solutions can shift the
individual, private market back toward a model of collectivized risks, rather
than one that seeks to individualize risk through risk classification and
selection.
Restructuring private and public markets might more
fundamentally redefine and broaden current boundaries of risk pooling
among different private insurance markets, including eliminating the
distinction between individual and group insurance, and between public and
private markets.
The policies for defragmentation that accompany a mandate might define
future American conceptions about what degree and types of risk pooling are
appropriate and beneficial. By changing the baseline, norms and conceptions
of risk pooling might change over time. If both the current Health Reform
Law and future efforts broaden risk pools while maintaining, and perhaps
expanding, access to quality medical care for Americans, Americans might
grow in their support of programs that rest on broad risk pooling, as was the
case for both Medicare and Social Security. Americans might learn that
programs of broad health redistribution are not only less painful than
imagined but perhaps largely beneficial. The twenty-five-year-old who resists
buying insurance today might come to see that his participation today is a
critical element in creation of a social norm of broad risk pooling and that this
norm will make premiums affordable for him when he grows older.
In addition, the structure of the programs themselves might lessen future
barriers to health redistribution, by actuating altruism among members of the
program, as discussed earlier in the context of Gillian Lester’s work.356 For
example, by grouping people together into more heterogeneously, cohesively
designed insurance markets and programs, it might be possible to shift the
notions of who should share risk with whom.357 Americans might begin to
understand structures that facilitate mutual security with respect to health
risks as valuable reciprocal endeavors and perhaps begin to feel commonality
through membership in such a program with a more broadly defined group of
enrollees. It is possible this sense of commonality would translate into a
willingness to support a program that serves to ensure access to medical care
for a broad population.
During the current political debates, the actions of Medicare beneficiaries
provide the perfect illustration of the power of how we initially define
communities of shared risk.358 The resistance to reform by current Medicare
beneficiaries led to ironic cries at town hall meetings of “keep your
356
See Fehr & Gintis, supra note 196; Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 196; Lester, supra note
150, at 22-31, 43-46.
357
Cf. Hunter, supra note 9, at 51-56. Nan Hunter contends that the structure of
employer sponsor insurance might be ideal for building notions of health solidarity within the
workplace if health benefits were allocated through a process of deliberative democracy in the
control of the employees themselves. Id.
358
Medicare also shows the risks of incremental reform. Medicare was intended to be a
stepping stone on the way to universal health care. Clearly, it never got us there and now
serves as a barrier. As we engage in incremental defragmentation, we risk redefining lines of
risk sharing somewhere on the line to full defragmentation at an intermediary point that will
then become calcified itself.
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government hands off my Medicare,”359 in protest to expansion of public
insurance. This resistance by Medicare beneficiaries to reform is perfectly
illustrative of the power of line drawing. Before Medicare, seniors shared
little in common with respect to their health risks, apart from a higher
likelihood of both needing medical care and finding it difficult to obtain
insurance. With Medicare, the government decided to pool risk among all
seniors, creating a program where they would contribute while working for
the opportunity to draw benefits once retired. Within this program, seniors
don’t typically object to the fact that they are pooling risk with other seniors,
even through some are considerably sicker than others. But they are fiercely
resistant to changes that might begin to soften the boundaries of “Medicare
beneficiary” as currently (and somewhat arbitrarily) defined and thus force
them to share risk with others. While this fierce loyalty is a bane to current
reform, it shows the power of creating a group identity by how we draw the
lines around a risk pool or a health insurance program. Medicare might speak
to the promise of generating broader notions of solidarity over time if
membership lines are drawn more broadly.
Are there limits to how broadly we can draw lines and maintain solidarity
among insureds? In her recent work, Nan Hunter has argued that employer
groups might actually provide an ideal structure on which to develop
collaborative processes for making decisions about risk allocation.360
Coworkers are a group with a previously shared identity and whose wellbeing
is tied to each other through the employer’s success. It’s also possible that
people with identifiably similar characteristics, such as the elderly or veterans,
can more naturally cohere into groups and programs of mutual assistance.
However, the solidarity underlying health insurance systems built upon broad,
heterogeneous, and typically non-employment-related risk pools in all other
industrialized nations suggests that it might be possible to draw the lines of
inclusion and participation much more broadly and maintain, and even
perhaps grow, an underlying ethic of mutual aid.
Thus, what is at stake in decisions about continued efforts at
defragmentation might be both the ability of the individual mandate to affect
health redistribution and also the American perception of how much health
redistribution and mutual aid is desirable for a society.
VI. CONCLUSION
While often held up as a key to insurance market efficiency, the individual
mandate has potential to do more. There are at least three visions of what the
mandate might accomplish that have threaded through popular, political, and
scholarly discussions of the mandate. In this paper, I have characterized them
as paternalist, efficiency, and redistributive objectives.
For many, support for the individual mandate arises in part out of its
ability to promote health redistribution in a climate where doing so through a
single payer system is politically unlikely. They see the mandate as a tool to
359
See, e.g., William Wong, Don’t Touch My Medicare Benefits!, S.F. Gate (Aug. 25, 2009,
07:00
PST),
http://www2.sfgate.com/cgibin/blogs/wwong/detail?blogid=156&entry_id=45987.
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Hunter, supra note 9, at 51-56.
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distribute the costs of medical care more broadly by compelling the healthy or
lucky into risk pools with the sick or unlucky. The mandate’s ability to
promote health redistribution in this way can unlock some of the benefits
Americans hope will result from health reform. In particular, many look to
reform to create a world where all Americans can see a doctor or go to the
hospital when they are in need, regardless of their past health problems or
limited means – a vision the mandate can support best if it promotes broad
health redistribution.
Yet, fragmentation of American insurance markets aims to individualize
risk in a way that will thwart the mandate’s effectiveness on this front. This is
because health redistribution relies on the mandate’s ability not only to
increase coverage but also to draw the healthy into risk pools with the sick so
that within these risk pools they help finance care for those sicker or less lucky
than themselves. Fragmented insurance markets prevent such risk pooling in
structural ways – by dividing up insureds into separate public and private
markets – and through the use of risk classification and selection processes
that distribute risk unevenly and inequitably among insureds within each
market.
If an individual mandate is to serve the objective of health redistribution,
it must be implemented in conjunction with policy reforms that reduce
fragmentation in markets. The Health Reform Law takes important first
steps at defragmentation by regulating the private insurance markets to
prevent fragmentation within these markets. Additional, more fundamental
and structural efforts at defragmentation are left, however, to future reform
efforts.
The degree of defragmentation undertaken is important in the short term
and the long term. In the short-term, defragmentation will more evenly
distribute the costs of health reform among all Americans – healthy and sick.
In the long term, the degree of defragmentation (or the level of risk pooling or
collectivization) might in fact help shape Americans’ views about the
appropriate level of risk pooling. If a mandate compels Americans to join a
health insurance system that, by spreading risk broadly, is better able to
provide everyone with access to care when in need, this redistributive system
might over time be seen as serving a socially important role. Americans might
grow to tolerate, appreciate, and perhaps even identify deeply with
membership in such a program, legitimizing the health redistribution that
occurs within. If redrawing the lines of where risk is pooled could serve this
legitimizing function, defragmentation may be critical not only for the
mandate’s short-term success but perhaps also for the long-term sustainability
of health reform build upon an individual mandate.

